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A B S T R A C T
Every mobile phone contains a modem subsystem responsible for
communication with mobile networks. In contrast to the well known
main system of smartphones, running for example an Android op-
erating system, the modem hardware details and its software are se-
crets of the manufacturer, leaving the modem as a black box to us.
Hence, this work analyzes recent Qualcomm modems supporting the
latest deployed communication standard LTE. We then use the gained
knowledge to implement a patching framework allowing easy modi-
fication of the modem’s firmware binary in a high level programming
language. To demonstrate its usability, we realize applications rang-
ing from debugging tools up to LTE MAC layer sniffing, security key
extraction and access to channel estimates of the physical layer. These
also show that malicious code in the modem subsystem imposes a se-
vere and realistic threat. Furthermore, this work opens the modem as
a research platform for recent mobile network technologies, removing
the need for expensive special equipment in many research projects.
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Jedes Mobiltelefon enthält ein Modem-Teilsystem, welches für die
Kommunikation mit Mobilfunknetzen verantwortlich ist. Im Unter-
schied zum gut verstandenen Hauptsystem von Smartphones, auf
welchem zum Beispiel ein Android Betriebssystem läuft, sind die
Hardware-Details und die Software des Modems Geheimnisse des
Herstellers, weshalb das Modem für uns eine Black Box darstellt. Da-
her analysiert diese Arbeit neuere Qualcomm Modems, die den neues-
ten eingesetzten Kommunikationsstandard LTE unterstützen. Wir nut-
zen die dadurch erlangten Kenntnisse dann um ein Patching Fra-
mework zu implementieren, das Modifikationen der Firmware-Binär-
datei auf einfache Weise in einer höheren Programmiersprache er-
laubt. Um dessen Nutzbarkeit zu demonstrieren, realisieren wir An-
wendungen von DebuggingTools bis hin zu LTE MAC Layer Snif-
fing, Security Schlüssel Extrahierung und Zugriff auf Kanalschätzun-
gen des Physical Layers. Diese zeigen auch, dass bösartiger Code im
Modem-Teilsystem eine ernste und realistische Bedrohung darstellt.
Zusätzlich öffnet diese Arbeit das Modem als Forschungsplattform
für neueste Mobilfunktechnologien und beseitigt die Notwendigkeit
für teures Spezialequipment in vielen Forschungsprojekten.
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Part I
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In the first part, we give an introduction into the topic and
motivate this thesis. After presenting some general back-
ground, the aims of this work are defined and explained.
We show why we focus on Qualcomm hardware only. The
second chapter of this part summarizes previous work re-
lated to this thesis. Background knowledge about the LTE
communication standard closes this part.

1
M O T I VAT I O N
Today, almost every person carries a mobile phone or even a smart-
phone in the pocket throughout the whole day. These devices con-
tain a large amount of various sensing capabilities, ranging from a
microphone over a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver to cam-
eras and many other sensors. In addition, users often store many
login credentials and other sensitive data on their phone. Paired with
rich communication facilities, such as Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN), Bluetooth and mobile communication networks, they build
a valuable target for attackers to spy on users and to collect data.
Most attack scenarios today focus on the main operating system,
High Level Operating System (HLOS), running on the phone: Google
Android (86.8% of market share), Apple iOS (12.5%), Microsoft Windows
Phone (0.3%) to name the ones with the most important shares (oth-




subset of the overall
functionality.
phone consists of many subsystems responsible for different subtasks
of the whole system and each of them might contain a processor run-
ning some kind of instruction code. The main processor running the
HLOS is just one of them, even though the most important one as it
coordinates and controls the other subsystems like audio processing
or WLAN.
These subsystems are often forgotten but an attack mounted di-
rectly against one of them would be able to act hidden from the user
and withstand common countermeasures as only the internals of the
subsystem are modified and not its external appearance to the other
parts of the system. In case of a communication device, the attackers
code could intercept all of the user’s communication and forward it
to the attacker. On the other hand, depending on the overall system
architecture, the subsystems usually have limited access to other sub-
systems (especially memory containing sensitive data, we show that
in detail later), minimizing the capabilities a bit but still presenting a
severe danger.
Besides security considerations, access to these subsystems and
knowledge of how they work is crucial to use smartphones as cheap
research platforms. They can be used to implement new concepts,
for example a new communication standard or to analyze the effects
of modifications to existing protocols. Also, access to internal func-
tions, measured values or states would allow various research usages,
like analyzing how a system adapts to certain external conditions or
getting measurement values in a test setup. These are just some appli-
cations, in general it is desired to use the already existing system as
3
4 motivation
a base instead of having to rebuild everything from scratch or using
expensive special equipment.
Unfortunately, from this point of view, most subsystems are pre-
sented as closed black boxes to end users. Only the company building
the subsystem, or sometimes also the company designing the smart-
phone integrating them, has access to internals and, in case it contains
programmable components, the code running on it or configuring it.
This code is also called firmware.The modem is
presented as a black
box to us, we do not
know how it works
internally and
cannot modify it.
Of course, our wish for an open modem which we can modify,
contradicts the security aspect discussed before: an attacker should
not be able to modify the system to insert malicious functionality, for
this, it is desired to check the authenticity of the subsystem’s code.
One of these subsystems is the mobile communication modem that
we discuss in the next section and which is the focus of this thesis.
1.1 mobile communication modems
The mobile communication modem is responsible for handling com-
munication of the phone with a base station in a cellular network.
It enables data communications of the phone, transmitting and re-
ceiving voice and allows other services like Short Message Service
(SMS). All lower level details, for example how the signals are physi-
cally transmitted over the air, are hidden from the rest of the system.
The external interface of the modem exposes only the final user data
and a small amount of control commands. Chapter 5 shows why the
modem is often called baseband.
Handling processing tasks of the modem in a separate subsystem
helps facilitating system design and, more important, allows meeting
the deadlines in the processing of time critical tasks (real time system),
which is needed often in communication systems, for example the
system has to send at an exactly defined time. In addition to that,
the processing system in the modem is optimized for the calculations
occurring, leading to energy efficient operation.
Furthermore, the code of the modem is subject to strong regula-
tions and needs to be certified by a responsible authority in order to
allow operation of the device in some countries. By the separation
into different subsystems, companies can change the main operating
system without a new complex certification of the mobile communi-
cation component.
Modems usually implement a collection of cellular network stan-
dards, depending on the target market and development time. Since
this work focus on recent modems, we only consider Long Term
Evolution (LTE) capable modems. In addition to this, GPS is imple-
mented together with the modem hardware in some cases.
It gets obvious that the modem is a quite interesting target for an
attacker. All user communication passes through it, including data
1.2 aim of this thesis 5
and phone calls. With GPS being integrated, also precise location
information is available. Besides, the interest in a smartphone modem
as a basis for research on mobile communication networks is easy
to see since all the communication standards are implemented here,
mostly in software as we show in the analysis part.
1.2 aim of this thesis
This thesis has two main aims:
• Gain a better understanding of basebands and their internal
architecture
• Modify code running in the baseband:
– See how well it is protected against attacks
– Use the hardware for research
This thesis takes a





The first aim is a prerequisite for the second one. Without knowing
anything about the system, modifying the code is impossible. The
security aspect also relates closely to how the system is designed and,
for an analysis in this direction, we need to know the internals of
the architecture. However, it is also interesting on its own to know
how the baseband works internally, for example to discover design
flaws, finding improvement possibilities, as basis for other work on
basebands or out of curiosity. We address this aim in Part ii.
The second aim was discussed extensively in the motivation be-
fore. We want to see how well the baseband is protected against
attacks, make it possible to demonstrate attacks on deployed devices
and open it for modifications in the context of research. This could,
for example, simply be accessing the baseband’s internal data and
logging it for network analysis. More advanced scenarios are testing
new algorithms and adding features to the modem. Part iii targets
this aim and also presents example modifications.
1.3 basebands in smartphones
As integration in smartphones increases to reduce costs and enable
smaller devices, a single chip integrates many functions. Therefore,
the baseband is usually bundled in one chip with the main processor
and only radio frequency analog processing is done externally. Since
this chip includes many important system functions, we refer to it
as System on Chip (SoC). Smartphones with separate baseband chips
barely exist anymore and because of this they are not considered here.
Feature phones usually do not include LTE capabilities, even though
this might change in the future as Qualcomm recently released a SoC










Figure 1: Baseband market share in first half of 2016, numbers from [21]
As a result, the manufacturer of the baseband is identical to the one
of the main processor in the phone. This leads to only few different
devices (manufacturers) of basebands present in the market.
1.3.1 Market Share
Figure 1 shows the market share of basebands in the first half of
2016, including those not capable of LTE. We can see that only aOnly a few
companies develop
the modems found in
smartphones.
few companies hold significant shares, namely Qualcomm, MediaTek
and Samsung. If only LTE capable basebands are considered, Qual-
comm gained an even higher share of 54% [21] and as MediaTek is
mainly active in China, for Europe Qualcomm’s leading position is
even stronger.
This makes their devices an interesting target for attacks but also
for research purposes as many already purchased devices can be
used. As a consequence, we focus this work on basebands by Qual-
comm solely.
2
R E L AT E D W O R K
We can group related work to this thesis in two categories. The first
class analyzes modems and firmware modifications and is therefore
related to the method we use to achieve the aims in this thesis. Work
in the second group, on the other hand, is related to one of our key tar-
get applications, the collection of baseband internal data, approach-
ing this goal by other methods.
2.1 baseband reverse engineering and modification
Previous works in this direction pursued three different intentions:
• Gaining knowledge about the system
• Modifications or attacks having direct access to the phone
• Security aspects concerning scenarios with over-the-air vulner-
abilities, in which an attacker has no direct access to the phone
In 2010, Weinmann gave a first insight into smartphone basebands
with “All your baseband are belong to us” [39]. His work focused on
the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) software stack
running in the modem, where he discovered many security issues.
These included classical memory corruptions and buffer overflows,
due to unchecked length fields from GSM messages (his work fo-





to the code basis of the software stack originating in the 1990s when
security threats were less ubiquitous and network elements could be
considered trusted. However, hardware capable of running a GSM
base station got much cheaper and is now also affordable to attackers,
allowing to exploit the security issues. Two years later, in his paper
“Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in
Cellular Protocol Stacks” [40], he describes the found vulnerabilities
in detail and presents exploits to gain remote code execution.
In between, in 2011, Delugré [11] analyzed the operating system
running on a Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
stick with a Qualcomm baseband. Modifying this device was possible
since the authenticity of the firmware was not checked and it con-
tained diagnostic commands to read and write memory at arbitrary
locations. He then also presented a functional debugger for the de-
vice.
Miras worked on unlocking carrier locks in smartphones. His talk
[24] goes far beyond these main topics and discusses suitable reverse-
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engineering and patching techniques for his target system, an Apple
iPhone 3G.
With his next talk on basebands in 2013 [41], Weinmann published
a good starting point for this work. He talked about the evolvements
in basebands from Qualcomm, especially the new Hexagon Digital Sig-
nal Processor (DSP) used instead of a classical Advanced RISC Ma-
chines (ARM) core, which is the topic in Section 6.1. He also men-
tioned the risk that the baseband had a master role on the data bus in





mentioning security mitigations done by Qualcomm (stack canaries,
non-executable stack and heap, kernel/user-mode separation, ...), he
shows that he could still find many classical security issues, like stack
overflows, in the basebands.
The talk [13] shows research on another platform and targets Sam-
sung’s Shannon baseband. In this talk, the authors break down the
firmware binary format, have a look at the running operating system
and software stack, as well as search for vulnerabilities and exploit
them. In addition, they give a detailed look at their reverse engineer-
ing process.
Table 1 gives an overview over the related work discussed.
2.1.1 Contrast to this work
The reader might now ask why another work in this direction is nec-
essary after these. This is for several reasons:
Table 1: Overview of related work
Year Title Author Target platform Covered Topics
2010 All your baseband R.P. Weinmann Infineon/Intel over-the-air attacks
are belong to us [39] Qualcomm (ARM) (GSM)
2011 Reverse engineering a G. Delugré Qualcomm operating system,
Qualcomm baseband [11] (ARM USB modem) own debugger
2011 The baseband playground [24] L. Miras Apple iPhone 3G firmware patching,
(Infineon baseband) reverse-engineering
2012 Baseband Attacks: remote R.P. Weinmann Infineon/Intel over-the-air attacks
exploitation of memory corruptions Qualcomm (ARM) (GSM)
in cellular protocol stacks [40]
2013 Baseband exploitation in R.P. Weinmann Qualcomm evolvement of
2013: Hexagon challenges [41] (Hexagon based) basebands
2016 Breaking Band - reverse N. Golde Samsung Shannon reverse-engineering,
engineering and exploiting D. Komaromy over-the-air attacks
the shannon baseband [13]
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• The work is outdated: basebands changed significantly in the
last years.
• None of the previous publications presented a general overview
over the modem, including its hardware and software.
• They were considered with specific aspects rather than a general
overview.
• Different scenarios were considered, e.g. over-the-air attacks,
in contrast to our assumption of full access to the phone and
firmware modifications done by “legitimate” users.
• We present a patching framework which allows to easily apply
patches to firmwares.
In addition, we implement applications that are possible with the
gained knowledge and developed framework.
2.2 internal data collection
There are also previous works with the intention of obtaining inter-
nal data from the modem. All the projects known to the author do
not modify the baseband but instead leverage a diagnostic interface
offered by the unmodified baseband firmware (available from the An-
droid system under /dev/diag). Other projects to
collect modem
internal data exist.
As they all use an
existing diagnostic
interface, they are
limited to the data
available there.
Qualcomm itself developed a tool called QXDM [30]. It runs on a PC
connected to the phone, rather than directly on the phone, therefore,
its use is limited to cases where an external computer is available
and not feasible for data collection in everyday scenarios with users
carrying the phone around. Since it is introduced directly by the
manufacturer, it can make use of a large set of data options, possibly
all that is available on the diagnostic interface. In the case of LTE,
this includes layer 3 messages, measurements of the physical layer,
current state of protocol state machines and much more. Please refer
to the documentation of the tool for an extensive list.
With Azenqos’ AZQ Android, a commercial tool making use of the
interface exists [4]. It runs a user space application directly on the
phone, together with a modified kernel. It offers similar functionality
to Qualcomm’s QXDM. Measurements, decoded layer 3 messages and
other data are shown in real time to the user. It is also capable to log
data and it provides analysis tools for common scenarios.
The MobileInsight project is slightly different [23]. Here, researchers
try to make the data of the diagnostic interface available for further
research in other projects. It therefore includes a documented Appli-
cation Programming Interface (API), is extensible and can be used for
research without any charges. Its functionality is limited to the mes-
sage types currently implemented, again mainly layer 3 messages and
some physical layer measurements are supported.
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We can summarize that the three tools use the same data source
and collect similar kinds of data. The main difference is where the
tools collect the data and how they provide it to their users. This
also leads to a common problem of all these: they are limited to the
data offered by the diagnostic interface, if the desired data is not
available at the interface, there is no way to get it from here. For
example, this is the case for Channel State Information (CSI), which
we extract in Section 10.6. This limitation is weaker for Qualcomm’s
QXDM as they have access to the firmware and can implement the
desired messages. However, for some sensitive data like encryption
keys Qualcomm might not be interested to expose them externally and
with that introduce new security threads.Firmware
modifications are
rather complex but
allow to retrieve all
internal data from
the modem.
By gaining access to the modem’s firmware, the approach pre-
sented here has the potential to extract all internal data used by the
baseband. On the other hand, we have to find and reverse-engineer
the relevant code section of the firmware, in order to know how the
manufacturer implemented the target feature and how we can read
the desired value. As a result, we suggest to first use the diagnostic
interface for data collection and only start modifying the firmware
for cases which cannot be handled by that.
Other projects intend to collect data of LTE networks with Soft-
ware Defined Radio (SDR) implementations, for example in [8] the
authors decode the control channel of LTE to monitor resource allo-
cations of all users in a cell, also allowing to keep track of the load of
the network. As these are based on specific hardware rather than on
commercial off-the-shelf smartphones, they are targeting quite differ-
ent use cases than this thesis and cannot satisfy the aim of research
on cheap devices.
Please also note that data collection is only one aim of this thesis.
All the presented projects are not able to modify the modem code.
Therefore, they can only listen but not actively modify data, for ex-
ample to see how a network reacts to manipulated values. For the
same reason, they are not suitable for extending the modem with
new features.
3
B A C K G R O U N D : LT E B A S I C S
The objective of this chapter is to provide a minimum background
knowledge of the LTE technology to understand this thesis, if LTE is
already known this chapter can be skipped. It is far out of scope of
this work to provide a full summary of the LTE standard. Therefore,
we discuss only important parts of the technology and explain only
few details which are used later in this work. For more details, we
advise the reader to have a look at the LTE specifications or one of
the numerous books and online explanations available (for example
[34]).
3.1 lte overview
Figure 2 summarizes the protocol layering used in LTE. We primarily
focus on the Physical Layer (PHY) and the Medium Access Control
(MAC). However, as we can see in the figure, higher layers interact
with these layers, mainly to be able to configure parameters of the
lower layers by higher level messages. As a result, a basic knowledge
of these layers is also required.





Physical Layer (PHY) modulation for air interface, power con-
trol, cell search, measurements (for example channel estima-
tion)
Medium Access Control (MAC) (de-)multiplexing from logical
channels to transport channels, (priority based) scheduling of
logical channel data, retransmission and error correction with
Hybrid ARQ (HARQ)
Radio Link Control (RLC) concatenation and segmentation of
SDUs to fit in frames, duplicate detection, error correction with
ARQ
Packet Data Convergence Control (PDCP) in-order packet
delivery (user and RRC control data), ciphering for user and
control data, integrity protection for control data, Internet Pro-
tocol (IP) header compression
Radio Resource Control (RRC) broadcast system information
for NAS, paging, connection management, security (configura-
tion, establishment, key management), maintenance of radio
bearers
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Figure 2: LTE protocol stack layers (adapted from: [44])
Non-Access Stratum (NAS) support of mobility, authentication,
session management: establish and maintain IP connection for
moving devices
In this description, we already used the concept of logical, transport
and physical channels between the layers. Logical channels in theCommunication






interface between the RLC and MAC layers are used to distinguish
between various kinds of traffic. They differentiate control and data
traffic as well as whether it is dedicated for a single user or shared
by multiple users. Transport channels in the communication of MAC
and PHY layers on the other hand define how the data should be
transmitted. At last, physical channels relate to the representation of
the data in radio transmission and define which physical resources
are used. For example, for the initial random access procedure (ex-
plained later in Section 3.3) dedicated physical transmission resources
are reserved. Table 2 describes the available channels. For the trans-
port and physical channels, the downlink channels (base station to
User Equipment (UE) communication) are listed first, followed by the
uplink channels (UE to base station). The “Maps to” column indicates
over which lower level channel the data is transmitted.
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3.2 phy layer
In this section, we present the basics of the LTE PHY layer related
to this work. LTE uses a different modulation scheme in the uplink
than in the downlink. However, for this thesis mainly the downlink
structure is relevant and we therefore focus on this direction here.
Also we solely consider Frequency Division Duplexing (FDD) LTE
networks.
3.2.1 Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM)







Division Multiplexing (OFDM) modulation. This technique splits the
available carrier bandwidth into subcarriers. Each of these subcarriers
is then modulated individually with data mapped to Quadrature Am-
plitude Modulation (QAM) or Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying (QPSK)
symbols.
Table 2: Channels in LTE (based on [35])
Acronym Channel Name Usage Maps to
BCCH Broadcast Control Channel Broadcast of System Information Blocks BCH/DL-SCH
(SIB) and Master Information Block (MIB)
PCCH Paging Control Channel Paging of UEs PCH
CCCH Common Control Channel Control information for multiple UEs DL-SCH





DTCH Dedicated Traffic Channel Traffic (user-plane) for a particular UE DL-SCH
MCCH Multicast Control Channel Multicast control information MCH/DL-SCH
MTCH Multicast Traffic Channel Multicast data (user-plane) MCH/DL-SCH
BCH Broadcast Channel Broadcast of MIB PBCH
PCH Paging Channel Paging of UEs PDSCH
DL-SCH Downlink Shared Channel Data transfer, SIB PDSCH






RACH Random Access Channel Initial access to network through RACH PRACH
UL-SCH Uplink Shared Channel Data transfer PUSCH
PBCH Physical Broadcast Channel Broadcast of MIB
PDCCH Physical Downlink Control Ch. Control channel: scheduling, UL grant
PDSCH Physical Downlink Shared Ch. Data transfer, SIB, paging
PMCH Physical Multicast Channel Multicast
PHICH Physical Hybrid ARQ Indicator HARQ ACK/NACK status





PUCCH Physical Uplink Control Ch. Signaling (scheduling requests, HARQ)
PUSCH Physical Uplink shared Ch. Data transfer
PRACH Physical Random Access Ch. Random access
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With the subcarrier values, we define the desired components of
the signal at the subcarrier’s frequencies. Therefore, the subcarrier
values are equal to the representation of the desired signal in the
frequency domain. As a result, the OFDM modulation can be imple-
mented by calculating an Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) on
the subcarrier values to get the time domain data to sent. Similarly,
the receiver can calculate a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on the re-
ceived time data to find back the modulated subcarrier symbols.
Please note that LTE additionally applies scrambling to the user
data stream, before mapping it to symbols for the subcarriers, to deal
with burst errors. If Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) is active,
also some precoding is applied to the symbols and a mapping to the
different antenna ports is performed.
3.2.2 LTE resource grid
The OFDM modulation divides the available bandwidth into subcar-
riers. Table 3 lists the bandwidth options specified for LTE, together
with the used number of subcarriers and resource blocks (which we
define later). In recent LTE releases, a network can combine multiple
of these carriers in a single cell (carrier aggregation, up to 5 carriers
from LTE Release 10 onwards), thus increasing the amount of avail-
able resources.
In the time domain, LTE uses a regular structure with fixed dura-







sist of ten subframes which have two slots each. These again contain
seven OFDM symbols, in case the network is configured for extended
cyclic prefix only six symbols fit into one slot. Table 4 summarizes this
structure.
By this means, the available resources for transmission are divided
in frequency (OFDM subcarriers) and time (slots in frames). Each slot
and subcarrier pair describes a distinct resource which can be used
to send data. LTE leverages this to assign these blocks for different
purposes: the physical channels introduced before, synchronization
signals and reference signals which we explain in Section 3.2.3. The
Table 3: LTE bandwidth options
Bandwidth Available subcarriers Resource blocks
1.4 MHz 72 6
3 MHz 180 15
5 MHz 300 25
10 MHz 600 50
15 MHz 900 75
20 MHz 1200 100
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Figure 3: LTE downlink resource grid for 1.4 MHz, two transmit antennas
(based on [12])
blocks of the PDSCH channel are further assigned to different users.
To reduce signaling overhead, a Resource Block (RB) groups 12 ad-
jacent subcarriers and one slot in time and distribution to different
users is done in this granularity. Figure 3 illustrates the resource
structure in a grid of time and frequency, showing an example of






two sending antennas (small bandwidth chosen for better overview).
White blocks are available for PDSCH channel allocations.
With this resource allocation scheme, LTE is flexible in sharing the
available bandwidth between users, depending on their traffic de-
mands and signal quality, to increase the total throughput over the
network while keeping fairness between the users.
Table 4: LTE frame structure
Unit Duration Consists of
Frame 10 ms 10 Subframes
Subframe 1 ms 2 Slots
Slot 0.5 ms 6/7 OFDM symbols
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3.2.3 Channel fading
The physical communication channel between the UE and the base
station, also called Evolved Node B (eNodeB), imposes attenuation
and phase change to the signal. For typical LTE channels, this is
not a constant factor but the channel’s influence on the signal highly
depends on the frequency, for example, caused by multipath propa-
gation. In addition, due to mobility of the users and changes in the
environment, the channel strongly varies over time. These effects are
called frequency selective fading. At a fixed point in time, the chan-
nel H in frequency domain can be described as the (complex) quotient




For a small enough range of f (bandwidth), we can assume H to be










an OFDM subcarrier of LTE with a bandwidth of 15 kHz. As a result,
the channels influence can be described by a single complex value for
each subcarrier, called Hs(k) in the following with k being the index
of the subcarrier.
If these are known to the UE, it can compensate the channel’s in-
fluence, by reversing the channel equation in the discrete case, to get
back the transmitted symbol from the received signal (Ys and Xs are




In addition to using the channel characteristic for decoding, the UE
can decide which subcarriers have the best signal strength and feed
this information back to the base station. This uses the data to opti-
mize the allocation of RBs, trying to use the currently best subcarriers
for each user.
3.2.3.1 Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO)
LTE uses multiple sending and receiving antennas to increase the
data rate or signal quality depending on the selected mode and cur-
rent channel conditions, called MIMO. The propagation properties
between each sending antenna and receiving antenna might be differ-
ent. Therefore, a different channel exists between each of these pairs,
which can be described in the form explained before. This leads to
a set of channel descriptions, alternatively represented by a channel
matrix containing the same information.
For spatial multiplexing, the sending antennas transmit different
signals. If now at least as many receiving antennas as sending anten-
nas are used, both sending streams can be recovered by the received
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signals and their differences, since the contribution of each sending
stream to each signal is known by the channel matrix. However, if the
channel coefficients for the receiving antennas are too similar, it is no
longer possible to separate different transmit streams as all receiv-
ing antennas report the same signal. In this case, transmit diversity,
which sends the same signal on both sending antennas, can be used
instead to improve signal quality but no longer profit from increased
data rates.
3.2.3.2 Channel estimation
Until now, we simply assumed that the UE knows the channel char-
acteristic Hs(k). In this section, we now explain how this is achieved.
The resource grid in Figure 3 shows that resources in a regular pattern
in frequency are occupied by reference signals (red). Fixed symbols,
known to the receiver by the LTE specification, are transmitted here,







coefficients at the reference symbols by their definition equation, as
it knows the received signal as well as the transmitted signal. For
the subcarriers in between the known pilots, the measured channel
characteristic can be interpolated or simply the closest neighbor can
be taken, leading to an estimation of the whole channel at the time of
the used reference signals.
Since the channel is fading over time, the estimation is only valid
for a short period of time and has to be repeated regularly to always
have a recent representation of the channel conditions. Because of
that, the reference signals are also repeated in time leading to a regu-
lar grid of resources used for channel estimation signals.
In the MIMO case, all channels between antenna pairs need to be es-
timated individually. To allow this, only one transmit antenna sends
a pilot signal at a resource while the other antennas remain quiet
on this block. A receiver can then determine all channels from this
transmit antenna to its receiving antennas like in the single antenna
case, since the pilot signal is not disturbed by other transmissions.
The resource grid in Figure 3 is for a base station with two transmit
antennas but only the view of one antenna. The marked reference sig-
nal blocks contain the reference signals of the first antenna, the ones
of the second antenna are transmitted in a similar grid which gets
visible by reserved resources in the perspective of the first antenna.
3.3 mac layer
The LTE MAC layer is located between the RLC and the PHY layers.
As a consequence, all messages from the higher layers pass through it,
including user data as well as configuration messages. In Section 3.4,
we show that encryption is applied in the PDCP layer. Therefore,
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data seen in the MAC layer from higher layers than itself might be
encrypted, depending on the current UE configuration.
The MAC layer is responsible for multiplexing logical channels to
transport channels in the downlink and demultiplexing the transport
channels in the uplink. It takes care of scheduling the transmission of
content from logical channels, based on the priority of the data. For
this, it also controls the uplink scheduling of the physical layer, for
example, by requesting it to send a Scheduling Request (SR) to the
network in order to get more uplink resources allocated.
A mechanism called HARQ realizes automatic retransmission and
error correction. Additionally, the MAC layer generates reports to
inform the network about the current amount of data in the UEs
buffers (Buffer Status Report (BSR)) and the currently used transmis-
sion power compared to the available power (Power Headroom Re-
port (PHR)). In the next section, we explain the MAC mechanism to
get a first uplink grant for data transmission.
3.3.1 Random access procedure
When a UE wants first to connect to a network, for example after it
was turned on, it does not have the needed uplink resources allocated
to transmit data to the base station and register in the network. Simi-
larly, no allocations are available when the UE is in idle state because





when they have no
resources assigned.
random access procedure.
Devices without an active uplink grant are allowed to transmit a
special preamble message on the RACH/PRACH channel, which we
will call Msg1 from now on. The UE can choose randomly between
64 available preambles, each of them orthogonal to the others such
that the base station can receive multiple preambles at the same time.
Note that conflicts can happen when two UEs choose the same pream-
ble at the same time. This is resolved later in the random access
process.
If the base station successfully received this message, it will re-
ply with a Random Access Response (RAR) on the DL-SCH channel,
Msg2. The target device of this message is addressed by a RA-RNTI
(Radio Network Temporary Identifier) value which is derived from
the timeslot in which the preamble was sent. The message includes
data for each sent preamble at this time: a temporary C-RNTI value
which will be used to identify the UE in the next steps, a timing ad-
vance value to compensate for the signal propagation delay between
the device and the base station as well as an uplink resource grant to
allow communication on the UL-SCH channel.
The UE reacts with an RRC connection request message (Msg3) in-
cluding the assigned C-RNTI value to identify itself. It gives the rea-





establishment cause, identity value
Msg2: Random Access Response
temp C-RNTI, timing advance, UL grant
Msg4: Contention Resolution
C-RNTI
Figure 4: LTE RACH procedure (adapted from: [5])
which can be either chosen randomly or reused from a previous con-
nection.
This is required to resolve contention between two devices. Let
us consider that two devices chose the same preamble at the same
time in the first step. Until this moment, the base station and UEs
did not notice that a conflict happened. Now, the base station will As transmissions in
this procedure are
random, conflicts
can happen and need
to be resolved.
at most successfully receive one of the Msg3 due to interference of
the signals and reply only to this one with the last message of the
procedure (Msg4). As this includes the identity chosen by the UE, all
other devices know that their RACH procedure failed and will try
again later, only the addressed device will continue communication
with a new C-RNTI value assigned in this message.
Figure 4 depicts the whole message exchange process. Note that
a slightly different contention free version of this procedure exists
which is used, for example, in handover cases. Here, the preamble
to select is preassigned to the UEs, hence no conflicts with identically
chosen Msg1 can occur.
3.4 security
LTE implements security functionality in the PDCP and NAS layers.
The PDCP layer is responsible for security between a UE and a base LTE includes
encryption and
integrity protection
for control and user
data.
station (eNodeB). It provides confidential message delivery through
encryption and integrity protection by adding Message Authentica-
tion Codes (MACs) for data from the RRC layer in the control plane.
For user data, meaning IP traffic, it only provides confidentiality and
no integrity protection. Different keys are used for the two planes.
The NAS layer in addition ensures integrity and confidentiality of
its messages independent of the PDCP layer. It provides this security
between a UE and the Mobility Management Entity (MME), which is











Figure 5: LTE key derivation scheme (adapted from: [9]). Keys for crypto-
graphic operations are derived from a pre-shared master key (K).
a component deeper in the LTE system architecture and the target of
NAS communication.
To allow these, LTE provides mutual authentication of the UE and
network, as well as mechanisms for key negotiation. Figure 5 depicts
the key derivation scheme. Keys are derived from a pre-shared mas-
ter key (K), stored in the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and at
the network provider. This is used to generate a cipher (CK) and an
integrity key (IK). From these two, the local master key (KASME) is
derived which allows generation of NAS keys (KNASenc, KNASint) and
a base key for the current eNodeB (KeNB). The keys for PDCP op-
eration (KRRCenc, KRRCint, KUPenc) are then generated from this. Note
that in the figure we assigned KRRCenc, KRRCint to the RRC layer as the
PDCP layer uses them for messages of this layer.
LTE supports different types of encryption algorithms and in-
tegrity algorithms, called EPS Encryption Algorithm (EEA) respec-






options. Which algorithm to use is determined by RRC signaling and
the used cryptography keys depend on this selection. Four values
form the inputs to cryptographic operations, additionally to the key
and the actual message: count (sequence number), bearer ID, direc-
tion (uplink or downlink) and the message length. Note that also null
cipher and integrity algorithms are defined. These apply no encryp-
tion and produce a MAC of only zeros. Their purpose is to allow
emergency connections even when no SIM is available and thereby
no keys can be derived, a network should never be configured to use
them as algorithms for usual connections.
Table 5: LTE cryptography algorithms
Algorithm Based on
EEA0 / EIA0 none / null algorithms
EEA1 / EIA1 SNOW 3G
EEA2 / EIA2 AES
EEA3 / EIA3 ZUC
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TA R G E T H A R D WA R E
We first intended to carry out our research on the Google Nexus 5
smartphone. However, as the baseband’s firmware of this device is
authenticated, which is the topic of Section 7.2, it is not possible to
run modified firmwares on the modem of this phone, without exploit-
ing vulnerabilities of the security mechanisms.
As a consequence, we decided to shift towards the Asus PadFone
Infinity 2 (A86) , since Asus does not enable signature checks in some We use an Asus
PadFone Infinity 2





phones (details in Section 7.2.1) and this model uses the exactly same
SoC as Google’s Nexus device, a Snapdragon 800 or in Qualcomm’s nam-
ing scheme an MSM8974. Table 6 gives the main features of the SoC.
Further specifications of the two smartphones are also similar, as Ta-
ble 7 shows.
Even though we largely focus this thesis on the used target, many
of the results and, in particular, the developed patching framework
can also be applied to other phones, possibly based on other SoCs.
This is caused by very similar designs of recent Qualcomm modems
and simplified by all baseband firmwares originating from the same
source code base. We implemented scripts assisting in porting to
other phones, or just other firmware versions for the same phone.
They are presented in Section 9.3.
Please note that, at least until a vulnerability is found to bypass
the authentication, modifications are only possible on devices with
Table 6: MSM8974 (Snapdragon 800) specifications (source: [31])
CPU 4x Qualcomm Krait 400
L1 (CPU) Cache 2x16 kB (instructions + data) per Core
L2 (CPU) Cache 2048 kB per Core
GPU Qualcomm Adreno 330
Technology 28 nm
DSP Hexagon audio/sensor/user DSP
Modem LTE Category 4
2x2 MIMO
DL: 150 Mbps, 64QAM, 2x10 MHz (CA)
UL: 50 Mbps, 16QAM, 1x20 MHz
Hexagon (QDSP6v5) based
TCM (modem) 256 kB
Further features QuickCharge, Bluetooth, 802.11n/ac,
image processor (camera), video core,
NFC, USB 3.0, GPS/GLONASS, ...
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disabled authentication or on devices which use insecure debug keys
for signing. This is the biggest limitation currently, decreasing the
length of the list of potential target devices significantly. We discuss
this issue in Chapter 11.
Table 7: Target devices specifications (sources: [3, 22])
Asus PadFone Google Nexus 5
Infinity 2 (A86)
SoC MSM8974 MSM8974
OS (newest) Android 5.0 Android 6.0.1
RAM 2 GB 2 GB
Storage 16/32 GB 16/32 GB
Screen 5 “ (1920x1080) 4.95 ” (1920x1080)
Release date October 2013 October 2013
Part II
A N A LY S I S O F Q U A L C O M M M O D E M S
We take a look at the internals of Qualcomm basebands in
this part. After a first focus on the hardware architecture,
its integration in the overall smartphone system and a de-




S Y S T E M A R C H I T E C T U R E
To understand the function of the modem, in particular the digital
baseband part of it, in the following sections we present the archi-
tecture, starting with a coarse overview up to a detailed view of the
baseband internals.
5.1 overall system
Since all recent Qualcomm chips have a similar structure, at least re-
garding the modem, we have an exemplary look at the Snapdragon
800 (MSM8974) chip. Figure 6 shows the SoCs architecture, with the
modem in the lower right corner. This view demonstrates the con-
nection between the modem and the main processor: shared memory.
The modem has direct access to the system’s main memory. To com- In modern
smartphones, the
modem is part of the
main SoC. It
communicates with
other parts of the
system through
shared memory.
municate with the HLOS, it places data in a common section of this
memory. Communication in the other direction is done in the same
fashion. As a consequence, large amounts of data can be passed eas-
ily between the two entities. We give more details on this process,
especially on the protocols used for data exchange, in Section 7.5.
A problem of this direct access to the main memory of the modem
is security. The modem could in theory access all user data, for exam-
ple variables of running applications or data from the Android kernel.
Therefore, a malicious modem would lead to a complete system com-
promise. Section 6.2.1 presents the mechanism used to prevent this.
Note that communication through shared memory is only used in
case of a modem integrated in a SoC. In case of a discrete modem
chip or a USB stick modem, some kind of high-speed serial link, for
example USB, replaces this link.
5.2 modem architecture
Figure 7 depicts the modem system.We obtained it by simplifying var-
ious smartphone schematics and it is only a coarse overview, omitting
details like amplifiers or baseband filters.
Since mobile communication networks are defined on a wide range
of frequency bands, the system includes multiple antennas, each op-
timized for a certain range of frequencies. Also, the system needs
multiple antennas on the same frequency band to support MIMO
transmission modes. These are connected to switches which connect
them to filters for the different frequency bands supported by the an-
tenna. After passing through the filters, received signals are fed to
25
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Figure 6: Snapdragon 800 system overview (adapted from: [10])
an input port of the transceiver chip. Analogously, signals to trans-
mit take the inverse way, coming from an output port of this chip.
These ports are internally connected over a switch to the receiver (or
transmitter) circuitry. Note that the number of antennas and filters
shown in the diagram is chosen arbitrarily and will be different in
a real system. To overcome the limitation of the maximal possible
supported bands by the number of ports the transceiver chips offers,
system designers can add additional switches in between. However,
this introduces some signal attenuation.
The transceiver converts the Radio Frequency (RF) signal down to
the baseband with Inphase and Quadrature (IQ) components. ForThe modem consists




signals and a digital





the transmitting case, it converts up from the baseband IQ signal to
RF. Now this signal contains only frequencies lower than the used
maximum channel bandwidth and can be sampled using an Analog-
to-Digital Converter (ADC) in the digital baseband block. All further
processing is done on the digital data using a processor. For the trans-
mit path, this system generates the signal and it is then converted to
an analog signal for the transceiver by a Digital-to-Analog Converter
(DAC). Since this is a straightforward transceiver system found in
common literature, we do not discuss it in further detail here.
Note that only the digital processing (so the baseband block) is
part of the SoC, all analog processing is done by external components.
This is also the reason why it is common to refer to the modem sub-
system as baseband: the digital system we are talking about is only
the part of the modem responsible for processing and generating the
baseband signals. In the rest of this thesis, we are only concerned
with this part of the modem.
In addition to the signal paths, the transceiver and the switches
need control signals. These are also generated by the baseband block.
On its other side, this block interfaces with the rest of the SoCs system
as seen in the previous chapter.
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Figure 7: Modem architecture overview
5.3 digital baseband
As described before, the digital baseband block in Figure 7 handles
decoding of the sampled signal and generates a stream of samples for
transmitting. This means it demodulates the signal and decodes its Baseband signals are
processed in the
digital domain, on a
DSP also running
the higher layers of
the communication
technologies.
meaning according to the implemented communication technology,
handles commands, generates responses and so on. For transmitting,
it encodes its messages and modulates them according to the commu-
nication standard. In other words, it implements the protocol stack
of this technology or, more generally speaking, all stacks of the tech-
nologies it supports.
Since these stacks are extensive, a processor running some code
is used. In case of the Qualcomm modems considered here, a special
DSP developed by the company itself is integrated. It is called QDSP6
(Hexagon) and we review it in detail in Section 6.1. All code, includ-
ing control intensive protocol parts, runs on this DSP in addition to
the actual signal processing. Older basebands, or those from other
vendors, might use an additional general purpose processor (often
an ARM core) or a combination of this and a DSP.

6
H A R D WA R E C O M P O N E N T S
In this chapter, we review the hardware components used in the base-
band. After describing the included processor with its specialities, we
look at access protection units and a dedicated on-chip memory.
6.1 hexagon processor
Qualcomm uses a self-developed processor called QDSP6 (Hexagon)
for code execution in their modems. This processor is a DSP and
therefore optimized for the calculations occurring in signal process-
ing, for example digital filters or the calculation of an FFT. It can
perform this kind of operations faster and more energy efficient than
a general purpose processor.
A second look at Figure 6 reveals that the same processor type is
re-used for audio and sensor data processing. Actually, Qualcomm Qualcomm released
documentation and




released a Software Development Kit (SDK) [28] to enable developers
to create their own code running on the DSP for processing of sensor
data or using it as a general hardware accelerator. Even though this
SDK targets another DSP instance in the SoC, its tools can be used for
the processor of the baseband. As a consequence, a full toolchain with
compiler, assembler, linker and other relevant utilities for processing
binary code files, including a disassembler, are freely available. Note
that, to deploy own code on the basebands DSP, additional steps
not present in the SDK are necessary, for example to pack the final
firmware binary into the correct image format. We target these steps
in Chapter 9.
Qualcomm’s release also includes the documentation of the utilities
and, most important, the processor core [33]. Unfortunately, this doc-
umentation is incomplete and does not contain all instructions, for
example the ones solely intended to be used by the Operating Sys-
tem (OS) are not documented. However, in the process of reverse-
engineering, we also see these instructions and have to understand
their behavior. For the IDA Pro reverse-engineering tool from Hex-
Rays at least two Hexagon processor module plugins exist, both of
them still containing some problems. The one available at [17] was
found more stable for code analysis and the Python disassembler of
the one at [25] is used by the patching framework in Chapter 9.
After an overview of the different versions of the Hexagon DSP, in
the remaining sections of this chapter, we show the details of the
processors architecture. If not explicitly denoted otherwise, the infor-




The QDSP6 (Hexagon) family is the latest revision of Qualcomm’s DSPs.
It comes in different versions, released starting from 2006. Table 8
summarizes the main features added with each of the versions. This
information is collected from the programmer’s reference manuals
[32, 33] and from Weinmann’s talk [41] as these documents are not
longer available in the Internet for all older processor versions.
The smartphones used in this work contain a MSM8974 SoC which
uses a QDSP6V55 for the baseband.
6.1.2 Instruction packets
The Hexagon DSP has four execution units which accept data. Each







meaning the action they perform is explicitly encoded in the firmware
by the compiler. Therefore, instructions for the Hexagon processor
are grouped into packets which it executes in parallel in the same
processing cycle. Due to large amount of instruction data needed
for that (up to four 32 bit words for a single processing cycle), this
concept is called Very Large Instruction Word (VLIW). Figure 8 shows
the execution units.
Table 8: QDSP6 versions
Version Release New features
v1 2006 first release, mainly as a multimedia DSP
v2 2007 lower power consumption
higher efficiency for control code
improved support for modem applications
v3 2009 new instructions (pause,
vector instruction, undocumented ones)
v4 2010 virtualization instructions
support for SDR
debug & trace enhanced
v5 2012 dynamic multi-threading (DMT)
floating point support
enhanced data cache prefetch
v55 2013 cycle count registers (cycles since last reset)
new vector instruction
v60 2016 dual-cluster micro-architecture
simultaneous multi-threading (SMT)
v61 2016 new instructions
stack security features
packet counting
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Figure 8: Hexagon execution units (adapted from: [10])
We can see that the units are not equal but target different types






cannot contain four times the same instruction but the instruction
composition has to follow the abilities of the available execution units.
For the exact constraints and possible combinations, please refer to
Qualcomm’s programmer’s reference manual for the target DSP ver-
sion, for example [33]. In the normal case of writing code in a higher
level language (for example in C), it is the compiler’s task to group in-
structions into packets. However, when reverse-engineering or patch-
ing existing code, we have to analyze packets by hand and need to
generate valid ones.
Note that the instruction encoding only contains flags to indicate
whether or not another instruction follows in the same packet but not
to indicate the start of a packet. These are only known implicitly. This
can lead to problems in reverse-engineering and patching the code,
when the start of a function is detected in the middle of a packet or
a jump into a packet is generated. Luckily, it is rather easy to deal
with this but existing tools developed for other platforms might have
problems.
6.1.3 Constant extenders
Instructions can usually only include immediate values smaller than
a whole word, as they are only one word long and need space to en-




constants of the full 32 bits, this is a strong limitation and leads to
many instructions just to load a constant value. To overcome this,
Hexagon supports constant extenders (immext). These precede an in-
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struction and carry the remaining bits of a constant value needed
there. As a consequence, the processor can load constants with the
size of a full word directly and jumps over the whole address space
are possible (memory addresses are also 32 bit long) in a single in-
struction. The disadvantage of these extenders is that they also con-
sume an instruction slot and therefore at least one execution unit has
to be left unused within the same packet. As in many cases the com-
piler will not find an instruction for all units in a processing cycle,
this reduces performance only slightly, likely less than the advantage
of the faster constant loading.
6.1.4 Hardware Threads
The QDSP6 features multi-thread support in hardware. Version 4, for
example, includes three hardware threads. Instructions from these
are executed by Interleaved Multi-Threading (IMT) in a round-robin





DSP looks similar to
a multi-core system.
ent threads look like independent processor cores running their own
codes. If more software threads are used than hardware threads are
available, they are multiplexed on these virtual cores. On the other
hand, when less threads are used only a fraction of the total DSPs
performance can be achieved.
The number of hardware threads matches the number of execution
pipeline stages. With this trick, whenever a new instruction is fetched,
all previous instructions of the same thread are finished completely
as shown in Table 9. Each row represents a pipeline stage and each
column an execution cycle, given by the thread for which a new in-
struction is fetched. The entries represent first the thread and then
the instruction number in this thread. Note that “Start” in the table
means not the first processing cycle but the start of the observation,
being at a time when each thread was already active once. At each
point in time, each pipeline step works on an instruction of another
thread which means no dependencies exist between them.
As a consequence, Qualcomm can largely simplify the internals of
the processor: no pipeline stalls can occur and no result forwarding,
branch-prediction or other techniques for performant pipelined pro-
Table 9: Execution of hardware threads in the QDSP6 pipeline
Instruction fetch
Start Thread 1 Thread 2 Thread 3 Thread 1
1 T3 - I1 T1 - I2 T2 - I2 T3 - I2 T1 - I3




3 T1 - I1 T2 - I1 T3 - I1 T1 - I2 T2 - I2
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cessing are needed. Nevertheless, other issues are introduced, for
example a separate register file is needed for each thread.
Starting from version 5, the Hexagon DSP supports an additional
mode called Dynamic Multi-Threading (DMT). With this mechanism,
hardware threads can be removed from the scheduler, for example
because they are not used, on cache misses or when waiting for inter-
rupts. The scheduler can then skip these threads and instead issue a
packet of the next thread. Note that a new packet for a thread can still
only be issued when the previous one finished completly. However,
some instructions do not need the full pipeline depth but can finish
in two cycles. Thus, with DMT and at least one inactive thread, a new
packet can be scheduled earlier after a packet with only such fast in-
structions and as a result the overall performance improves slightly
for some applications. [14]
6.1.5 Other specialities
The Hexagon DSP includes a few more specialities. Compound and
Duplex instructions encode multiple instructions into a single word
to reduce code size. Hardware loops realize loops with less overhead
than software only loops (up to one level nesting). Since a detailed
discussion of all these is not the topic of this thesis, please refer to
the reference manual for more details on these and other additional
features.
6.2 other related components
Besides the DSP, the baseband contains ADCs to sample the received
analog signals, respectively DACs to generate baseband signals to
transmit. Additional hardware components, presented below, com-
plete the system.
6.2.1 Access Protection Units
Qualcomm includes Access Protection Units (XPUs) into their chips to
implement access rights depending on the requesting system compo-
nent. They are placed between the peripheral components and the
interconnect bus. Thus, each peripheral unit has its own XPU. Our XPUs ensure that
certain addresses in




target SoC MSM8974, for example, has at least 86 XPUs included,
maybe more which we did not discover. We gained the knowledge
about the units presented here from the experiments in Chapter 11.
After the initial configuration, such a XPU unit compares every ac-
cess to it against a set of rules and blocks if the access is not permitted.
In addition, an interrupt can be triggered on right violations, allow-
ing to take further measures, from reporting or logging the incident
up to restarting the complete system.
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These rules, also referred to as Resource Group (RG) in Qualcomm’s




permissions (read/write) are defined for components of the SoC, for
example the application processor or the modem DSP. Second, rights
are given to contexts (roles) of the running code, here are non-secure,
secure (TrustZone) or modem possible. Only when a permission is given
by both criteria, the access is granted. Each rule has an owner who
is allowed to change the rule later, which is also one of the roles of
the accessing code. No one else can modify, deactivate or read the
rule after it was first given to an owner. As a consequence, even
TrustZone code, for example, cannot simply deactivate rules of the
modem, although it configured them at startup but then passed the
ownership to the modem.
Most XPUs allow to specify individual permissions in rules for
each component in the SoC (up to 32) for the first mechanism. How-
ever, some use a simplified hardware which is only capable to enforce
different permissions for one component and all the remaining ones
together.
In addition to this, different types of XPUs exist:
Register Protection Unit (RPU) These are used to protect reg-
isters of security critical peripherals. Each rule applies permis-
sions to a predefined set of registers. An example is the protec-
tion of accesses to cryptography peripherals, such that another
subsystem cannot tamper with the operation of the unit.
Area Protection Unit (APU) The second type is similar to the
first one but is intended for larger address areas, for example to
protect the Read-Only Memory (ROM) containing the Primary
Boot Loader (PBL) of the modem, instead of only single regis-
ters.
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) Rules of the last type do not
protect predefined regions as the other two. Instead, each rule
contains a start and an end address of the region it should be






especially the main RAM. By this means, they allow to isolate
the memory regions of the different subsystems in the shared
main memory and, for example, accesses from the HLOS to
modem internal data is prevented by hardware.
Bootloaders configure the XPUs during the startup phases of sub-
systems. In our focus case of the modem subsystem, this is the Mo-
dem Boot Authenticator (MBA) for the memory regions of the loaded
firmware. Thereby, the modem’s memory can no longer be read or
modified by the HLOS after it was authenticated, we discuss details
of this process in Section 7.1. Obviously, shared memory regions are
left accessible from the HLOS.
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Note that, in the case of MPUs, rules can overlap, meaning that two
or more rules can be defined for a memory region. This is taken into
account by the units and, depending on the owners of the rules, they
implement appropriate behavior, as listed in Table 10 for two rules
and the possibilities of their ownerships. Especially, if the modem
and another party configure rules for a region, it gets locked for all
accesses, even when both rules would give full permissions to all
components. Each accessed address is checked individually, thus, for
only partly overlapping rules, this logic only applies in the actual
overlapping regions of the rules.
On all tested phones, violations of the modem memory permis-
sions from the Android kernel lead to no visible extra measures from
the baseband system, except from the access attempt being blocked
by the XPU. However, the event could still be logged internally.
6.2.2 Tightly-coupled memory
Qualcomm’s SoC includes an additional memory in its baseband part,
called Tightly-Coupled Memory (TCM). It originates from the ARM
world and is, for example, described in [1]. As the name suggests, it
is a fast memory coupled closely to the processing core and accesses
to it can be handled in a significant shorter time than to the main
memory. This makes it similar to processor caches and its purpose TCM is a fast
memory similar to a
cache but more
predictable since it
can be controlled by
the programmer.
is indeed the same: speed up the access to frequently used code and
data. The main difference between the two is that a cache automat-
ically decides which memory locations it stores and, as a result, is
transparent to the running code, that means the operating system.
For TCM on the other hand, the software can explicitly determine
which memory addresses should reside in it, leading to higher pre-
dictability of its behavior and memory access times.
The instruction and data elements that are placed in the TCM are
controlled by the linker, it places the desired parts in special sections,
for example the memcpy function is located here. The OS of Qualcomm
then loads these sections into the TCM, when desired. Some sections
stay in the fast memory during the whole runtime while others are
loaded only when needed, depending on the currently used mobile
technology (GSM, UMTS, LTE, ...). The remaining space of the TCM
memory is used for dynamic allocations, this means for demands oc-
Table 10: Enforcing of rules by MPUs in case of overlap
Non-Secure Secure Modem
Modem Locked for all Locked for all Only last rule
Secure Only secure rule Both rules
Non-Secure Only last rule
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curring during runtime which cannot be foreseen statically at linking
time.
The TCM operation is close to a cache for the user code running
on top, only differing by the OS operations. Especially in the con-
text of this work, we can see it as a transparent cache without in-
fluence on, for example, the code patching operations we perform
in Part iii, where we apply changes to the baseband’s firmware. All
modifications are independent of this mechanism as the TCM content
is loaded during runtime from the usual firmware data, including our
modifications.
However, it is still of importance to understand it and know its
way of working as we will see references to the TCM during reverse
engineering, for example, in strings found in the firmware.
7
M O D E M S O F T WA R E
The code running on the DSP and how it is loaded is the focus of this
chapter. We also include the security aspect of the code authentica-
tion.
7.1 firmware loading
In order to bring-up the modem, its firmware has to be placed in the
system’s memory, the HLOS does this. It is a three stage loading pro-
cess as Figure 9 illustrates it and explained in the following. Numbers
in brackets refer to the step numbers in the figure.
To start the modem, first all related clock signals and voltage reg-
ulators are enabled, the modem restart signal removed. The modem Firmware loading is
a three stage process,
with each step
authenticating the
next one, building a
chain-of-trust.
now runs a Primary Boot Loader (PBL) which resides in ROM inside
the chip and is not changeable after manufacturing. It also includes
a digital certificate which is used to verify authenticity of the next
execution stages.
In the next step, the Android operating system loads the second
stage bootloader which is called Modem Boot Authenticator (MBA),
and tells the PBL where it located the MBA. The PBL then checks
the authenticity of the data by verifying a signature, contained in
the binary, with its certificate, we describe details on this verification
in Section 7.2. When this check succeeds, the PBL will pass control
to the loaded MBA. All code executed from now on resides in the
system’s main memory.
As a next step, the HLOS loads metadata of the actual firmware
and its authenticity is checked by the MBA. This metadata contains
information about the memory sections of the firmware, like their
length and destination address in the system’s memory. In addition,
it contains hash values of the data of all sections.
The different memory sections of the firmware are then loaded one
by one into memory and after each of those “blobs” the MBA is in-
structed to check the authenticity. Since it already has an authenti-
cated hash value for the contents of each segment, it just needs to
verify if these match.
When all these steps did not result in an error, finally control is
passed to the main firmware code. In case one of the steps fails, the
responsible bootloader will return an error and wait for repetition of
this step.
Note that, before the authentication step, the MBA locks all mem-
ory regions containing the data with an access protection unit (see
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Figure 9: Modem firmware loading process
Section 6.2.1), exclusively allowing the modem processor to access it,
withdrawing access rights from the HLOS. Therefore, it is not pos-






moves the loaded MBA code to a location solely accessible by the mo-
dem processor. This is the modem’s internal TCM memory in which
the complete MBA code and data fits. We assume that Qualcomm has
chosen this solution to simplify the one-time-programmable PBL as
it does not need to configure XPUs in this approach, minimizing the
possibility for security issues in code that cannot be updated after
shipping the chip.
The method described is not valid for all Qualcomm modems. Older
phones use the devices ARM TrustZone implementation to authenti-
cate the code, instead of directly performing the computations on the
modem’s processor. The TrustZone kernel is invoked by the HLOS
and informs the modem directly in case of success.
7.2 firmware authentication
In the last section, we saw a classical chain-of-trust with the PBL and
its included certificate as root of trust. How exactly authentication
is handled between the chains elements is topic of this section. First,
we present authentication of the main firmware code and then show
differences for authenticating the MBA.
The firmware image contains a chain of certificates (usually three).
The first of these is signed with a key from the last bootloader stage.
All memory sections of the firmware are hashed using the SHA-256
algorithm (SHA-1 is also defined but not used in any of the firmware
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images analyzed). These hashes are then placed in a table. Together
with a header structure (table_header), they build the data which is
actually signed. This header includes information where to find the
signature, the image size and the destination address of the firmware







in Figure 9). It is then hashed again.
A scheme similar to the construction of a Keyed-Hash Message Au-
thentication Code (HMAC) (refer to [20] for the general scheme and
used names) includes two identification numbers, found in the certifi-
cate, into the calculation: a firmware identification number (SW_ID)
is used as key in the first step, XORed with the ipad constant and a
SoC identification number (MSM_ID) XORed with the opad constant
as key in the second step.
For verification, the signature found in the image is checked by
applying the public RSA key in the firmwares certificate (pk_fw) and
checking the result against the calculated hash value. The overall
scheme can be summarized as:
H : SHA-256 hash function
‖ : concatenation
⊕ : XOR
RSA_verify : RSA signature verification (encryption)
hash_table = H(segment1) ‖H(segment2) ‖ ... ‖H(segmentn)
m = H(table_header ‖ hash_table)
hmac = H((MSM_ID ⊕ opad) ‖H((SW_ID ⊕ ipad) ‖m))
with ipad = 0x3636363636363636
opad = 0x5C5C5C5C5C5C5C5C
verify hmac == RSA_verifypk_fw(stored_signature)
To check the actual firmware memory sections, the authenticated In order to check the
firmware’s sections,
authenticated hashes
in the metadata are
compared with the
computed values.
hash values from the table are compared against the computed hash
value for each section. Note that the metadata already contains one
firmware section in addition to the authenticated part as described
above, the Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) headers. These are
also verified by checking the sections hash value.
Authentication of the MBA code from the PBL is handled in a sim-
ilar way. Its binary also contains a certificate chain which is verified
by the previous stage. However, since the MBA only contains one sec-
tion, the hash table is replaced by directly using the code data. This
is hashed together with the same header structure as before and used
as input to the HMAC process. After this, the signature verification
is done in the same manner as before.
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7.2.1 Issues
The used authentication method seems to be well designed, as it uses
a common structure and builds on well-researched cryptographic al-
gorithms. Problems on deployed devices emerge from another reason:
negligent smartphone vendors. For developer devices, the authenti-
cation can be disabled or configured to accept special development
certificates by settings in the one time programmable QFuses. For de-
vices on the end-user market, manufacturers should blow these fuses
(irreversibly program) so that a device only accepts correctly signed
modem firmwares. Therefore, this in itself is not a problem.
However, not all vendors activate the authentication mechanism on
their devices, be it with settings in the QFuses or with modifications
of the PBL or MBA. In [11] the Icon 225 USB modem was found to
skip the check of the MBA signature. During this work, thanks to anSmartphone vendors
are largely
responsible for
security, not all of
them activate the
authentication.
anonymous hint in an Internet forum, we found devices from Asus
to be configured insecure concerning this aspect. Either they use
publicly available development keys or no signature checks at all. It
might be the same for other vendors or at least some devices of other
vendors. This allows modifications of the firmware as we discuss
them in Part iii of this thesis. It leaves an open door to attackers,
especially as the modem firmware can simply be overwritten from
the running Android system (requiring root access rights) and will
be loaded on the next boot. On the other side, it opens the phones
for research purposes also discussed in this document.
7.3 operating system
Historically, Qualcomm used their completely self-developed operat-
ing system called Rex and later shifted to use Rex components on
top of an OKL4 microkernel from Open Kernel Labs [41]. However,
when Qualcomm’s basebands started to be Hexagon based, the com-
pany decided to change to a newly implemented operating system.
It was first introduced as Blast but then got renamed to Qualcomm
Real Time operating system (QuRT), with only minor changes. The
Hexagon SDK also includes this OS for user applications running
on the audio DSP. Even in Hexagon modem firmwares, still a lot of
strings refer to the old Rex OS, clearly showing the origin of the soft-




QuRT is a real-time OS tailored for the needs of the baseband. It
offers common OS functionality, abstracting from the DSP hardware,
including:
• Thread/Task management
• Communication and synchronization between Threads
• Cache/Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) management
7.3 operating system 41
• User memory management
• Interrupt and exception handling
• Timers and system clock
In the following sections, we review selected parts of the OS relevant
for this thesis in detail.
7.3.1 Tasks
In order to support multiple tasks, QuRT includes (software) threads.
These abstract from Hexagon’s hardware threads (presented in Sec-
tion 6.1.4). QuRT takes care of scheduling many software threads
on the limited available hardware threads, similar to scheduling in
a multi-core system. A priority value ensures that important tasks,
which need to be finished fast, for example the physical layer pro-
cessing in LTE, get the computing resources first. Additionally, inter-
rupts always suspend the hardware thread processing the task with
the lowest priority in the set of currently scheduled tasks, leading to





by an init system.
After system boot, QuRT initializes and starts tasks with its init
system rcinit. It is also capable of starting legacy Rex tasks which
were not yet ported to the QuRT implementation.
Synchronization between threads is provided by usual means, in-
cluding mutexes, semaphores, barriers and also atomic instructions
for more flexibility. Tasks can sleep and wait for signals of other com-
ponents to trigger continuation of their execution. A readable name
is also assigned to each task. Table 11 lists all tasks started on our test
smartphone’s baseband (Asus PadFone Infinity 2, baseband version
M3.12.15), obtained by modifying the task creation function of rcinit
and extracting the task information of interest. Shown are the tasks
name and its priority, which ranges from 0 (lowest) to 255 (highest).
Obviously, the active tasks depend on the features supported by the
modem and are therefore different for each model. For further details,
Appendix A.1 contains a listing of the rcinit startup sequence, includ-
ing task starts and thread creations. It allows to observe the loading
order of the various tasks and we can also guess which threads are
associated with which task. We see that one main thread is created
for each task with the same name as the task, some tasks spawn
more threads from this main thread and also create and destroy child
threads dynamically during runtime, similar to usual multi-threaded
programs.
7.3.1.1 Inter Process Communication
Communication between different tasks can be achieved by memory
regions shared between the tasks and utilizing the synchronization
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mechanisms to access them. However, QuRT also includes some more
advanced techniques, summarized in Table 12.
With the signal mechanism presented before, a thread can sleep and
wait for an event of another thread without consuming computation
time, leaving the resources to other tasks. As a consequence, this




arriving in a stream pattern, should be transferred from one sender
to one receiver, QuRT’s pipes are the right choice.
For more complex communication schemes, Qualcomm’s firmware
implements its own Inter-Process Communication (IPC) router, based on
the mechanisms provided by the OS but not part of it. Clients can reg-
ister to this router for message types they want to receive. The sender
of a messages tags it with an identification number structured such
that similar message types get similar IDs and, as a result, clients can
register also for ranges of IDs to get all messages from a module or
for a technology such as LTE. The sender of a message does not need
to know the receiving clients, leading to a loose coupling between the
modules and point to multipoint schemes being covered.
7.3.2 Memory management
QuRT takes care of cache and TLB administration as well as memory
address translation from virtual to physical addresses. To its user
code, it offers memory management in terms of a heap as almost every
operating system nowadays.
An implementation named Data Services Memory (DSM) pool ex-






might grow during their lifetime. To achieve this, it creates a chain
of memory buffers for each allocation, implemented as a linked list.
Whenever the buffers of the current chain are full, a new chain ele-
ment can be created to increase the capacity of the DSM chain. A dis-
advantage is that the access is slightly slower compared to a continu-
ously allocated memory region since accesses need to check in which
buffer which data bytes reside and potentially write or read over mul-
tiple buffer items, leading to the need to perform some bound checks
on each item. Note that still, even for large buffer allocations, this
structure can be advantageous as only smaller memory sections are
needed for the buffers compared to the requirement of a single large
region. This allows the heap to make better use of the available mem-
ory and, in case the remaining memory gets limited, it is more likely
that a set of small DSM buffers can be allocated rather than one large
continuous block.
The API includes basic functions for allocation and deallocation of
elements, to read, write and extract data as well as more advanced
features like locked access to allow sharing of a DSM chain between
multiple threads.
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Table 12: Inter Process Communication mechanisms
Mechanism Suited for
Signals Event notification
Pipes Point-to-point serial data streams
IPC router Point-to-multipoint messages,
possibly with unknown destinations
Shared memory Custom implementation, data
with synchronization shared between two tasks
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7.4 security features
After the severe security issues of basebands as shown in the related
work (Section 2.1), for example in [40], Qualcomm added attack miti-
gation techniques to their firmwares in the Hexagon era.
The XPUs of Section 6.2.1 enforce memory access rights, with rules
depending on the requesting component. Their initialization during
boot by the MBA and PBL implementations withdraws all rights of





The build chain used to generate the firmware image analyzes
all functions and automatically adds stack canaries to functions that
might contain stack buffer overflows: a random canary value is cho-
sen during the system start. It is then written as the last element
of the function’s stack frame and verified at the end of the function.
An exploit of the memory corruption would need to overwrite the
canary value in order to write into other stack frames and, for exam-
ple, modify the function’s return address. As a result, if the attacker
does not know the correct canary value, the stack modification will
be detected and an exception will be raised. We can clearly see this
mechanism during reverse engineering Qualcomm’s firmware.
According to R.P. Weinmann in [41], these additional security mea-
sures are present:
• Safe unlinking for the heap: prevent exploitation of heap over-
flows
• Data execution prevention by a non-executable stack/heap (op-
tional, OEM can decide)
• Kernel/user mode separation (optional, OEM can decide)
7.5 communication with hlos
Historically, modems were connected over a serial interface to the
main system. To control the modem, human readable AT commands
(from attention) were used, encoded in the American Standard Code
for Information Interchange (ASCII). The command AT+CPIN=“1234”,
for example, would try to unlock the SIM with the PIN code 1234.
Data communication was also handled over such a serial link using
the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP).
Especially the AT protocol is a rather inefficient encoding, for in-
stance a simple byte value uses up to three bytes instead of just oneThe HLOS
communicates with
the modem over a




and to encode the value it has to be converted into an ASCII character
string.
Therefore, more efficient and flexible protocols were developed, we
review Qualcomm’s QMI protocol in Section 7.5.2. Since these proto-
cols are proprietary, we will see that still an AT interface is imple-
mented in the modem for legacy and compatibility reasons.
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Section 5.1 shows that the communication between the baseband
and the main system is realized by shared memory, replacing a phys-
ical serial link. The lower layers in the used protocol stack emulate
behavior similar to the serial interface.
7.5.1 Protocol stack
Table 13 gives an overview of the used protocols and their layering.
The Shared Memory (SMEM) driver provides access to the physical
available memory. It implements allocation and safe access to the
shared memory areas, taking care that no access conflicts between
the two entities, communicating over the shared memory, happen. It
also translates addresses from a virtual address space to the physical
locations where the shared memory area was placed. Abstraction from the
raw memory is done
in multiple layers,




On top of this layer operates the Shared Memory Driver (SMD). It
offers independent data channels, identified by names. Its API for
these channels includes functions to read and write a serial stream of
data and also supports data transfers in packets.
Finally, various protocols for the different purposes use these chan-
nels. For example, the implementations include a serial interface
(TTY) emulation. By using this, the modem looks like being con-
nected over the same kind of serial interface as in an architecture with
modem and main processor separated. Another protocol example is
the NMEA 0183 implementation to connect the GPS system, which
then seems to be connected like a typical GPS receiver and standard
drivers can be used to process its data.
The most interesting protocol for this thesis is the Qualcomm MSM
Interface (QMI), used to send commands to the modem. In the prac-
tical part, we also use it to exchange messages between the Android
kernel and our injected code in the modem firmware (Section 10.1).
7.5.2 Qualcomm MSM Interface (QMI)
The QMI protocol contains three types of messages: requests, re-
sponses and indications. Requests can be issued to services which
then later answer with a response message. When multiple requests
Table 13: Protocol layering for communication between Modem and HLOS
QMI TTY ... purpose specific protocol
SMD independent serial channels
SMEM access and allocation of memory
Shared Memory physical memory
46 modem software
are issued in a short time, the responses might arrive in another or-
der but include the request ID and can be matched by this. Indication
messages are send by services without a previous request in case a
certain event happens, removing the need to poll for state changes.




ient. Before a client can access a service, it has to allocate an ID at
a special control service (CTL). After this, it can send messages to
the services implementing the different functions, for example to the
Device Management Service (DMS) or the Network Access Service
(NAS). [27]
Be aware that, depending on the used kernel driver, this registra-
tion might be implemented inside the driver and occur transparently
to the code using the QMI interface. This is notably the case for Qual-
comm’s QMI driver in the here used Android kernels.
A 32 bit service ID together with a 32 bit value, distinguishing be-
tween different instances implementing the same service, for example
in two different subsystems like the modem and the audio process-
ing system, identify services. These should be unique, however, in
Section 10.1.2.1, we give a practical example in which this is not the
case. The parameters in QMI messages can be mandatory or optional,
which can also depend on other parameter values. They are encoded
using Type-Length-Value (TLV) fields.
8
R E V E R S E E N G I N E E R I N G T H E M O D E M
As the internals of Qualcomm’s modems are the company’s secret,
only few information is available in publicly available documenta-
tion, or can be derived from this. Therefore, the remaining infor-
mation needs to be obtained through reverse engineering. Results
from previous projects, presented in the related work chapter, can re-
place this reverse engineering or give at least a starting point. Even
work on older modem models is included here, since obviously Qual-
comm’s engineers do not redesign the whole modem hardware and
software from scratch in each revision but reuse large parts of the
design. However, we have to verify that a design aspect is still valid
and if not analyze how it changed.
We used multiple techniques to reverse engineer the target mo-
dem system. Inspecting the related Android kernel code, which is




they allow to deduce
the presented results.
the communication mechanism between the modem and the HLOS
(Section 7.5) as well as the firmware loading scheme (Section 7.1) as
they require corresponding implementations in the Android kernel.
The firmware loader, together with investigation of the raw firmware
image in a hex editor, respectively the files contained in the image,
allowed to derive the firmware format used (Section 9.1), a prerequi-
site for all further analysis of the modem’s software and the key for
modifications.
Knowing the firmware format, we can convert it into a common
format (ELF) which allows using well established reverse engineer-
ing tools such as IDA pro. In Section 6.1, we already introduced the
available plugins for the used Hexagon processor for IDA. Well es-
tablished techniques then allow to analyze the firmware. Especially,
strings inside the binary were found useful as we show in the next
section.
Additionally, Qualcomm released an SDK for the Hexagon DSP, tar-
geting user applications on the audio accelerator. As it includes the
same OS, information about the QuRT Real Time Operating System
(RTOS) can be collected from the code of the SDK. It also contains doc-
umentation of the build tools which were useful in the development
of the patching framework.
These are completed by techniques used in special cases, for spe-
cific purposes. An example are dynamic observations of variable
values in the patch code implementation phase. Allowing simple
dynamic analysis scenarios is also the aim of the modem memory
access patch (Section 10.3).
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The mainly used static techniques can be summarized by:
• Android kernel code analysis (firmware loader, QMI, ...)
• Raw binary inspection
• SDK analysis (QuRT, build tools)
• IDA pro reverse engineering
– String analysis
• Other techniques for special purposes
8.1 string analysis
When loading the firmware of our target device, the Asus PadFone
Infinity 2 (A86), the IDA tool found a total of 79,198 strings in it. Some
of these are false detects and do not contain a useful string. Another
portion of the strings is never used, or at least IDA could not find a
reference. Still, a large number of helpful strings remains.
These strings include, among other things, file and function names,
conditions of assertions as text representation as well as status and
error messages. Listing 1 gives a few examples. The first string is ob-The most helpful
tool to analyze the
modem were strings
in the firmware
binary as they reveal
many details of the
code.
viously an error message. By comparing the condition under which
it is printed, we can identify the “payload_ptr” referred to in the
message in the assembly code referencing the string.
Even more useful is the second example in the listing. It first tells
that the function it is used in is a “CSF::CALLBACK”, which we can
identify as acronym for channel state feedback callback, allowing to la-
bel the function with a meaningful name. It also tells that we are
now “entering csf post processing”, so what the following code of
the function is doing. With this knowledge, we might be able to also
label several called functions with names and thus successively get a
better understanding of the firmware’s internals. The variable value
outputs in the format string allow to label a list of variables (frame,
subframe, carrier_index, sys_bandwidth, csf_config_flag) when we
Listing 1: Example strings found in modem firmware
1 Fatal Error: ’payload_ptr == NULL’ %d%d%d
2
3 CSF::CALLBACK frame=%d, subframe=%d, carrier_index=%d, sys_bandwidth=%d,
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compare them with the parameters passed to the print function to-
gether with the string. These may be stored in registers or stack
locations local to the function and the identification of them greatly
helps in understanding the purpose and the way of working of the
target assembly code. If the variables are even global variables, stored
in system wide memory locations, they also provide information for
analyzing further functions.
The last example of Listing 1 simply contains a filename. Inter-
estingly, it contains the whole path of the file on the build system.
Strings like this one allow to know what file the surrounding code
comes from and with that estimate its purpose. They help to shrink
the amount of code to search for the correct target function, for a
given feature, in the large modem code.

Part III
M O D I F I C AT I O N O F F I R M WA R E S
In this part, we present the developed patching frame-
work enabling firmware modifications. For this, we ana-
lyze the structure of the firmware image and demonstrate
the needed steps to successfully modify the image. In




PAT C H I N G F R A M E W O R K
As mentioned in Section 1.2, the aim of this work is to modify the
modem’s firmware in order to extend its functionality, get access to
internal data or to mount attacks. We have to modify the binary
image to achieve the desired behavior as the modem’s source code is
not publicly available. In early stages of this work, firmware patches
were first done by hand, either in assembler or before by even directly
computing the binary encoding of the instructions and placing them
in the binary. Obviously, this is time consuming and only feasible
for small patches like changing a string constant, re-directing a jump
to another function or removing a condition check (for example to
remove a SIM lock).
Simply writing in a higher level language and using a compiler is
not possible as the code has to be linked with the existing firmware





values which need to be corrected, as seen in Section 7.2. Therefore,
in addition to the code compile step, we need to perform many more
operations, which we detail in Section 9.2.
It should now be obvious that for complex firmware modifications
some more sophisticated solution than applying patches to the binary
by hand are desired. As a result, inspired by the nexmon project [36],
we implemented a patching framework using Python scripts to real-
ize custom functionality. Makefiles control the build process and call
the different tools (Hexagon compiler, linker, ...) and Python scripts.
This framework includes the following main features for patch
code:
• Overwrite functions by annotating a patch code function with
an attribute
• Place functions in pointer tables (e.g. handler dispatch tables)
using an attribute
• Call functions of the firmware
• Call an original (overwritten) function of the firmware by using
an automatically generated function named in the form
“FUNC_NAME_fw_org” (explained in Section 9.2.3)
To enable these functions, the framework needs to know the positions
of functions and other symbols (like strings) inside the target firm-
ware binary. These can be specified in additional firmware wrapper
header files, in Section 9.2.2 we give more details.
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to generate a valid digital signa-
ture for the patched binary, needed to pass the authenticity checks
described in Section 7.2. Therefore, the framework can only be used
for smartphones with this check disabled (Section 7.2.1).
9.1 firmware image format
A special partition, formatted with a File Allocation Table 16 (FAT16)
file system, stores the modem firmware. System updates contain an
image file of this partition and can, therefore, be used as source to






for the MBA and the
actual firmware.
dumped from a running phone. Our target devices use a size of
64 MiB. Other phones use slightly different capacities, mainly depend-
ing on what firmware files for other subsystems are also placed on
this partition. Table 14 lists the set of files it contains for the modem,
together with their purposes.
The files can be grouped into two categories: metadata files (.mdt)
used by the firmware loader in the Android kernel and the files con-
taining the actual content being loaded (.bXX) into the basebands
memory section. For the MBA, only one content file is used. The
actual firmware, on the other hand, uses between 20 and 30 files, de-
pending on the modem model and enabled features. Each of these
files contains one of the sections specified in the ELF header. The
header can also define sections with a file size of zero or a memory
size bigger than the actual size of a section file. The loader then ini-
tializes these memory regions with zero bytes.
Since the first section contains an ELF header, all content files con-
catenated result in a valid ELF file of the firmware (padding bytes
between the files might be required).
Note that the firmware metadata file is equal to the concatenation
of the first two content files and therefore these files contain redun-
dant information. As these are only required for firmware loading,
the first two content sections are not actually loaded and the files are
Table 14: Files in a modem firmware image
File(s) Purpose Content
mba.mdt MBA loader information MBA metadata (ELF header)
mba.b00 MBA content MBA code, signature, certificates
modem.mdt FW loader information FW metadata (ELF header),
hash table, signature, certificates
modem.b00 FW content FW metadata (ELF header)
modem.b01 FW content hash table, signature, certificates
modem.b02 - FW content FW code sections
modem.bXX
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not required. They are only residuals of Qualcomm’s internal firm-
ware build process.
Please also refer to Section 7.1 to see how the files are loaded and
how the metadata is used.
9.2 patching process
In this chapter, we present each step of the patching process per-
formed by the framework in detail. The general steps are:
1. Extract a base ELF binary from the image file (Section 9.2.1)
2. Generate the firmware binary wrapper files (Section 9.2.2)
3. Analyze the patch code and create needed fw_org functions (Sec-
tion 9.2.3) Firmware patching
is done in many
steps, starting from




4. Compile the patch files (Section 9.2.4)
5. Link the patch code files together and with the firmware wrap-
per (Section 9.2.5)
6. Combine the (patch) base ELF file with the generated patch bi-
nary (Section 9.2.6)
7. Generate an image file which can be loaded (Section 9.2.7)
If one of these steps was already performed before and the input files
did not change, it will not be executed again. A good example for
this is the extraction of the base ELF file which needs to be done only
for the first run.
In addition to the (annotated) patch code, the framework only re-
quires the firmware image file and a wrapper defining existing func-
tions and their locations as inputs. In order to analyze the source
code, the framework uses a Python implementation of a C language
parser called pycparser [6] with the extension pycparserext [19]. For the
generation of fw_org functions, the hexagondisasm disassembler [26] is
required, we detail this in Section 9.2.3.
Due to the simple annotation interface of the framework, interac-
tions between the steps and generated intermediate files passed be-
tween the steps are rather complex. Figure 10 illustrates the process
and the used files. Numbers on arrows in the figure refer to the step
numbers in the list above. Table 15 details the contents and purposes
of all occurring files. In both of these, symbolic names (indicated
by all uppercase writing) are used for input files or files with names
depending on the actual patch project.
The framework overwrites functions by replacing the first instruc-
tion of the original function with a jump instruction to the new func-
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Figure 10: Overview of the patching process of the framework
(input files in red, output file in green and intermediate files in
gray)
case we still want to use the old function, we have to re-generate a




with a jump to the
patch code.
introduce in Section 9.2.3, target this problem.
An alternative approach to overwrite functions would be to patch
all calls and jumps to this function with the new address. Obviously,
this leaves the old function untouched and it could still be called from
patch code if needed. However, for this we need to find all calls to
the function. For call instructions with directly encoded destination
addresses this is feasible, for calls to an address stored in a register,
on the other hand, it is not trivial anymore to correctly patch them.
These occur, for example, when using function pointers in the source
code, a feature used extensively in the modem code. The chosen
approach guarantees to re-direct all occurring calls without special
treatment of this case.
Due to Hexagon’s interleaved execution of hardware threads, as
seen in Section 6.1.4, the processor completes all previous instruc-
tions before it loads the inserted jump instruction and finishes the
jump instruction before it will load the next instruction of this thread.
Therefore, in contrast to other processor designs, the computation of
the next program counter address is finished and the processor can
load the correct instruction, without the need to stall the pipeline or
having to remove incorrectly loaded instructions. As a consequence,
there are no extra pipeline penalties for jump instructions and the
total penalty of the inserted jump is only one execution cycle.
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9.2.1 Extracting the base firmware
The firmware obtained from a system update file or directly from a
phone is a partition image as seen in Section 9.1. We also discovered
that all the modem.bXX files together form an ELF file. Since this is a As first step, the
framework extracts
an ELF file from the
base image.
standard file format supported by many tools and therefore easy to
process, the first step the framework performs is to generate such a
file from the base firmware.
For extracting the section files from the image, the Unix program
mcopy (part of mtools) is used. A Python script (blob-merge.py) then
merges these. This script reads in the ELF information from the first
section file and then combines all sections into a single file by writing
the individual section file contents to the file offset indicated in the
read header data.
Table 15: Files used by the patching framework. Input files are listed first,
followed by intermediate files and the output image as last file.
File(s) Purpose Content
INPUT.img firmware input partition (FAT16) with firmware files
FW_WRAPPER.h input of information about declarations of functions in firmware
functions in firmware (annotated with addresses)
PATCH1.c - patch code input patch source code
PATCHX.c
fw_base.elf firmware in convenient format base firmware (ELF format)
for further processing steps
fw_wrapper.lcs information for linker about base firmware symbol definitions
base firmware binary
symtab.json aggregated information for base firmware symbol and function
fw_org functions generation declaration information (in JSON)
fw_org_functions.c code for fw_org functions fw_org functions definitions
fw_org_functions.h knowledge of fw_org functions fw_org functions declarations
in compilation of patch code
fw_org_functions.lcs correction of relative addresses fw_org symbol definitions
in fw_org functions by linker
PATCH1.o - binary patches ready for compiled patch code
PATCHX.o, linking (with relocations/symbols
fw_org_functions.o information)
fw_patch.elf complete binary patch ready linked patch code
for merge with base firmware
patched.elf patched firmware, patched firmware (ELF format)
input to image generation
modem.mdt, intermediate files for hash patched firmware sections and
modem.b00 - correction and image metadata
modem.bXX generation (see also Table 14)
patched_modem.img patched firmware output partition with patched firmware files
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Note that we based the idea of the script and the ELF header pro-
cessing on the pil-splitter.py script available at [37], which performs
the inverse operation, extracting segment files from an ELF file. We
also use this script later for generating the output image file in Sec-
tion 9.2.7.
9.2.2 Firmware wrapper generation
The binary file obtained in the previous step contains all the (ma-
chine) code of the firmware but no information about the functions
and their parameters inside these set of instructions. With the knowl-
edge of a function’s address and its parameters, it is possible to call
this address directly and place the parameters at the right positions.
However, this is not convenient for the patch code programmer and
since the function addresses are different between modem models
and even between different firmware versions for the same modem,
this patch would not be portable and only work with a single firm-
ware binary.
9.2.2.1 Purpose of the wrapper header
Therefore, information about the existing functions in the binary is
stored in a header file (wrapper). By including this header, functions
from the firmware binary can be called like a normal function in the






uses this file to define symbols (name to value/address mappings)
for the functions and feed them to the linker, so that it can resolve
the destination addresses for calls to these functions. We give more
details in sections 9.2.4 and 9.2.5 which are dealing with these steps.
A header file needs to be written by hand once for each firmware
version, however, in Section 9.3 we show scripts able to port the file
from one target to another automatically.
The framework also uses this wrapper to determine which instruc-
tions (addresses) need to be changed to overwrite a certain function
(Section 9.2.6) and to construct fw_org functions (Section 9.2.3).
As a result, the firmware image file itself and the wrapper header
are the only modem and version dependent files. Patch projects can
be processed for all targets with these available, as long as all used
firmware functions are declared in the header. Please keep in mind
that the internal structure of the firmwares could still be different,
meaning that discrepancies between available functions, their signa-
ture and their internal behavior might exist. Consequently, patch
code depending on such a function is not portable anymore or can
behave differently on particular targets. Luckily, the observed Qual-
comm firmwares were found to be very similar, especially the actual
mobile communication stack implementations seem to originate from
the same code base.
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9.2.2.2 Wrapper header content
Like a usual header file in the C language, the firmware wrapper
contains declarations of variables and functions with their signatures







__attribute__ mechanism for code annotations with additional infor-
mation of GNU C with an address attribute in order to define the
memory address of a function. Listing 2 shows an example to illus-
trate the syntax of this. To simplify the annotation even further, we
defined a macro ADDRESS here.
We can see that this approach keeps the effort to add the needed
data about a firmware binary small. It encodes all required infor-
mation for a function together. On the contrary, function signatures
need to be declared again for every new firmware, which could be
avoided by splitting the location data and signatures into separate
files. Then, however, we still need to write the function names in the
address file to identify the symbols resulting in only a small advan-
tage. Since available functions and their signatures might also differ
between firmwares as seen before (Section 9.2.2.1), we preferred the
other approach.
Note that the wrapper header file might also include other header
files, for example to group function declarations by purposes. Since
this is just a normal C include treated by the preprocessor, for sim-
plicity, we can consider the wrapper header as a single file.
In addition to functions and variables, the base address of patch
code and data segments can be defined in the wrapper by declaring
pseudo (void) pointers called __patch_addr_text_base__, respectively
__patch_addr_data_base__, with the same annotation scheme as before
to define the address.
9.2.2.3 Wrapper processing
Two files are generated from the wrapper header file as input for later The header is
transformed into a
linker script and into
JSON format for
further processing.
processing steps. The fw_wrapper.lcs file is a linker script containing
symbol mappings from all functions and variables declared in the
header to their address specified in the attached attribute. The main
Listing 2: Firmware function declaration example
1 #define ADDRESS(x) __attribute__ ((address (x)))
2
3 ADDRESS(0x09F88260) void* malloc(unsigned int size);
4 ADDRESS(0x09F87F40) void free(void* ptr);
5 ADDRESS(0x092B9AB0) int snprintf(char* str, unsigned int size, const
↪→ char* format, ...);
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control script handed to the linker can directly include this file as the
symbol definitions are valid linker control instructions.
As a second file, symtab.json is generated. It contains all informa-
tion of the header file (names, function signatures, addresses) in a
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. Its solely purpose is to
simplify reading in of the information in scripts of consequent steps
and avoiding the need to slowly parse the code again. It is used in
the fw_org functions generation (Section 9.2.3).
The create_wrapper_lcs.py script does this processing of the header
file. It parses the input wrapper file, using a Python C parser (pyc-
parser [6] with pycparserext [19]), and then writes out the data in the
formats of the two files.
9.2.3 Preparation: fw_org functions generation
In the general discussion of the patching process (Section 9.2), we
already saw the way to overwrite functions used by the framework:
the first instruction of the function is replaced by a jump to the patch
function. Obviously, this will destroy the original function as its first
instructions are missing and the remaining instructions will not be
reached by the processor anymore, at least as long as the code orig-
inates from a standard C compiler and contains no jumps into the
middle of the function. This seems to be no problem since we anyway
wanted to replace the function with a new one and, as a consequence,
do not need to original version anymore.
However, there are cases in which it is desirable to call the original
version of the function. Instead of changing a function completely,In many cases, it is






often one just wants to add some functionality to it. An example for
this would be to add a call counter to a function. The counter has to
be incremented after the function call, the rest of the function should
perform as the original function before. Another similar case could
be retrieving cryptography keys from a generator function. Here, we
first want to do the same calculations as the original function and
then do additional processing with the result. If the original function
is not available anymore, we have to re-implement the complete be-
havior of it, instead of just calling the old code at the desired position
in the patch function.
As a solution, the framework offers the fw_org functions. These
reproduce the behavior of the original (overwritten) function of the
firmware and, therefore, can be utilized in the examples given before.
They are used by simply calling a function with the name of the
original function appended with the postfix _fw_org. The framework
will then automatically detect this call and create the needed function
with appropriate content.
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9.2.3.1 Detection of required functions
The generation of these fw_org functions is quite complex and slow.
Therefore, as a first step, we need to detect which ones are needed
and should be generated, instead of creating all possible ones. For
this, with the Python C parser (pycparser [6] with pycparserext [19])
previously used for the wrapper header, the framework parses the
code and checks function calls for names ending with the identifier
prefix, leading to the list of required fw_org functions.
9.2.3.2 Function generation
To re-generate the behavior of the original function, we generate a





and then jump to the
rest of the original
code.
followed by a jump to the rest of the original code sequence, as only
the first few instructions were destroyed by the redirecting jump.
A jump instruction on Hexagon has a limited range for the destina-
tion address relative to the current execution address. Since the patch
code is located in another memory segment than the original function,
the redirection jump is usually far, with a value bigger than this range.
As a result, we might need a constant extender (Section 6.1.3) and, in
total, two instructions of the original function have to be modified.
When re-generating the first instructions of the function, splitting
an instruction packet (Section 6.1.2) would lead to undefined behav-
ior. As a consequence, always complete packets need to be copied.
Mostly, only the first packet needs to be re-implemented, solely in
case when the first packet contains a single instruction and a constant
extender is necessary for the jump, two packets need to be copied.
Since the instructions might contain relative addresses for calls or
jumps and they will be relocated to another address in the fw_org
function as before, simply copying the binary encoding values would
change their meaning. As a solution, the generate_fw_org_functions.py Relative references
in the instructions
are replaced by
symbols, as a result,
the linker solves all
problems.
script passes them to a disassembler implementation (available at
[26]), resulting in assembler code. The code, together with a jump
to the first instruction of the first unchanged packet of the original
function, is then used as inline assembler implementation in the sur-
rounding fw_org C function.
Our scripts replace all relative address values in this by symbols.
Thereby, the linker will take care of correcting the values depending
on the instructions final position. It will also handle problems when
a distance is now too far to be encoded in the instructions immediate
field by creating a jump to another location where it has enough space
to place a jump instruction together with a constant extender, a so
called “trampoline”.
Listing 3 shows an example of a generated fw_org function imple-
mentation. In line 3, we see that a relative address was replaced by
a symbol and in line 6 is the jump to the remaining original function
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code. Note that the C compiler will generate a function return after
this jump which will never be reached. Instead, the function ends
with the return instructions of the original code, which directly jump
back to the calling instruction of the C function.
These functions are written to the fw_org_functions.c file and signa-
ture declarations for them are available in the corresponding header
file (fw_org_functions.h). Definitions of the symbols occurring in the
inline assembler code are generated in fw_org_functions.lcs which has
the same format as the fw_wrapper.lcs file and therefore can also be
used directly as input to the linker.
9.2.4 Compiling
Next, the framework compiles all source code files individually. Ev-
ery called function is well declared for this step now, functions of theCompilation is
straightforward and
uses the compiler of
the SDK.
firmware are given in the wrapper header and the header file gener-
ated in the previous step contains the fw_org functions. In addition
to the patch code files, the generated code for the original firmware
functions in the fw_org_functions.c file is compiled. For this, we in-
voke Qualcomm’s compiler for Hexagon from the available SDK [28],
giving a set of object files as output.
Note that we ignore custom function annotations to overwrite func-
tions in this step (we show how these work later). These only influ-
ence the combination of the patch code with the base firmware file
but not the compilation process.
9.2.5 Linking
The individual object files need to be combined into a single binary.
This is done by passing them to the linker, again, we utilize Qual-
comm’s own implementation from the SDK [28]. The framework hands
the linker files generated in the previous steps to the tool in addition
to the object files, defining the symbols needed for fw_org functions
and the base firmware binary.
Listing 3: Example of a generated fw_org function
1 void* memset_fw_org(void* ptr, int value, unsigned int num) {
2 asm(
3 "{ if (r2 == #0) jump:nt sym_0x9130750\n\t"
4 "r7 = vsplatb (r1)\n\t"
5 "r6 = r0 }\n\t"
6 "{ jump sym_0x913065C }"
7 );
8 }
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The main work done by the linker can be summarized as: The framework
hands all compiled
files and control
scripts to the linker,
which resolves all
symbols in the patch
code but does not yet
combine it with the
base firmware.
• Usual linking process: link object files together, resolve unde-
fined symbols with symbols defined in other files (e.g. calls of
functions in other file, data references)
• Resolve calls to firmware functions and references to data of the
base firmware by using the symbol definitions in fw_wrapper.lcs
• Resolve symbols used in the inline assembler code of fw_org
functions with the symbol definitions in fw_org_functions.lcs
As a result, the linker generates a single file containing all the patch
code and data sections in ELF format (fw_patch.elf ). This file contains
no more undefined symbol references, the functions in it are in the
final version and will not be changed by later steps anymore.
9.2.6 Patching
After the patch code is in its final form, it needs to be combined
with the base firmware. Therefore, we have to merge the sections of
the two ELF files. In addition, changes to the base firmware code
to overwrite functions need to be done. This step then results in a
patched firmware ELF (patched.elf ) file, containing all the final modem
instructions and data.
9.2.6.1 Source code annotations
For overwriting functions, the framework’s patching process needs
to know which patch code should replace which function in the base
firmware. To make this as simple as possible, the framework uses a The patching step
merges patch code
and base firmware.
It is directed by
annotations in the
patch code, e.g. to
overwrite functions.
mechanism similar to the address specification of base firmware func-
tions in the firmware wrapper header. To specify a function replace-
ment, patch functions can be annotated with an attribute to overwrite
another function. This annotation includes the destination function
as a parameter.
Listing 4 shows an example of how to define the function mem-
set_hook so that it replaces the function memset (lines 1 to 5) of the
base firmware. Lines 7 to 19 use another feature included in the
framework, the pointer_table attribute. It allows to directly place a
pointer to a function in a table of function pointers. This scheme is
often used for handler functions which dispatch further message pro-
cessing to a next function depending on the message type, using this
value as index to a table of pointers which contains the processing
functions. It needs the table base and an offset value as parameters.
Note that patches also use it to replace a simple function pointer (not
inside a table) by using an offset of zero.
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9.2.6.2 Generation of a list of required patches
As a first substep to prepare the actual patching, the patcher.py script
generates a list of required changes. Afterwards, it processes the
patches contained in this list together.
The first patch added to the list is the task to include all memory
sections of the patch ELF file into the base binary. Then, characterTo first step of the
patcher is to identify
which modifications
are required.
string replacement tasks are added for the firmware version text as
well as the build time and date, if this is requested by defining a new
firmware name in the project’s Makefile.
The framework parses the patch code source files the C code parser
(pycparser [6] with pycparserext [19]) to find the annotations on func-
tion definitions as discussed in the previous section (9.2.6.1). For each
found overwrite directive, it adds a task to write a jump instruction to
the start address of the function which should be replaced and the ad-
dress of the new function as destination address to the list. Similarly,
for all pointer_table directives, it appends a binary replacement task
for the content of the pointer table entry with the patch function’s
address to the list.
It then hands the resulting list to the binary_patcher.py script to per-
form the actual patching of the ELF file.
9.2.6.3 ELF section combination
To combine a patch ELF file with the base firmware ELF, the frame-
work needs to insert all segments of the patch file into the base file.
Listing 4: Examples of function annotations
1
__attribute__ ((overwrite("memset")))
2 void* memset_hook(void* ptr, int value, unsigned int num) {
3 memset_counter++;





8 unsigned int services_response_handler (
9 void* clnt_info,
10 void* req_handle,
11 unsigned int msg_id,
12 void* req_c_struct,
13 unsigned int req_c_struct_len,
14 void* service_cookie)
15 {
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Two main cases need to be considered in order to insert a segment:
it can either contain data for memory already defined by a base seg-
ment or lie in a different address range than all existing segments. The sections of patch
and base ELF files




In the latter case, we can simply append it to the binary, maybe
with padding bytes before it to deal with alignments inside the ELF
file. We have to add its metadata to the header structure.
However, in most cases, the new segment’s memory address range
will overlap with an existing segment. Then, we split this existing seg-
ment in up to three new segments, one with the same address range
as the patch segment and potentially one before and after this. We
correct the ELF header structure accordingly and replace the fitting
segment with the new data.
Note that in case a new segment ends in another existing base file
segment than it starts, an error will be thrown as this is very likely
due to a size overflow error of the patch code and not intended, an-
other target segment as the one chosen for the patch code (or data)
would be overwritten.
9.2.6.4 Other binary patches
The framework handles patches to the base firmware data depend-
ing on their type. Simple data word patches (for example for the
pointer_table attribute) replace the content at their target address with






strings change a sequence of bytes beginning at a start address until
the terminating null character.
More complex are jump patches used to overwrite a function. These
generate the required instruction encoding for a jump from the in-
struction’s address to a destination address. If the jump distance is
too large for the immediate value in the jump instruction encoding,
a constant extender (Section 6.1.3) is used. For this, we have to write
one or two data words containing these instructions to the target ad-
dress of the patch. The original firmware function now immediately
jumps to the patch code version and, as a result, is overwritten with
the new version.
9.2.7 Image generation
As a last step in the firmware patching process, we need to generate
an image file which can be written to the device. Therefore, the frame-
work needs to convert the patched ELF file into an image file with the
same structure as the input image, which we describe in Section 9.1.
At the beginning of this step, our code extracts the files needed
for a firmware image from the ELF file. For that, we write every
segment contained in the file to a separate file named in the form
modem.bXX. Additionally, we copy the firmware metadata stored in
the first two segments (ELF header and integrity/authenticity data)
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of the ELF binary to the modem.mdt file. This is handled by the pil-
splitter.py script which is again largely based on the code available at
[37]. We applied only minor changes to the script, mainly refactoring
of the code.
For the MBA to accept the firmware data, the hash values in the
firmwares header table in the metadata need to be valid for the loaded
segment files (Section 7.1). Since the hashes are for now simply copiesAs a last step, the
framework generates
an output firmware




of the values for the base firmware segments and the patch code
changed these, all hashes need to be computed again and replace the
old values at the matching offsets in the hash table. The pil-patcher.py
script (again based on code available at [37]) takes care of this correc-
tion.
Note that we would also need to recompute the signature in the
metadata, used for firmware authentication (Section 7.2), in the gen-
eral case. However, since we do not have the right private keys to
generate valid signatures which would be accepted by a device and
we therefore focus this work on devices which do not use a signature
or skip the check, no signature needs to be calculated.
In order to get the final image file, we need to write the individual
files to a single image file of a FAT16 partition. For that, we overwrite
the modem’s firmware files in a copy of the base image with the
output files of the previous step by using the mcopy tool. This image
now contains the patched modem firmware, together with all other
files stored on the partition, like the MBA code or firmwares of other
subsystems. It is ready to be copied to a target device.
9.3 porting to new targets
Adapting to a new target should be as simple as possible and should
require the smallest amount of work possible. A target in our con-
text means a certain firmware image for a device in a specific version
and, therefore, porting to another target includes both, adapting to
another firmware version of the same device used before and target-
ing a completely new device.
To simplify this, the patching framework itself is independent of
the target as long as it has a similar architecture and is based on the
Hexagon DSP, which is true for all recent modem models of Qualcomm.
In Section 9.2, we saw that the patching framework uses the following
inputs: the patch code, the firmware image and a firmware wrapper




a wrapper header file
from one firmware to
another.
of the target and the firmware image is the target itself. Consequently,
we only need to port the wrapper header file in order to support a
new target.
Since it is tedious to adapt the wrapper header by hand, which basi-
cally means to find back the correct locations of all known functions
in the new target firmware, we developed scripts to automate this
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process. They are able to automatically generate a wrapper header
for a new target, given a base firmware image with its wrapper. Ob-
viously, it can only find functions declared in the base wrapper for
the new target.
As additional feature, the scripts are able to locate functions con-
tained in an object file in a firmware image. This is useful for the ini-
tial reverse engineering, so to identify new functions which were not
previously labeled in another firmware wrapper header, for example
if one gets access to pre-compiled library files used for Qualcomm’s
firmware builds.
9.3.1 Implementation
The large similarity between the different target firmwares, originat-
ing from the same source and many parts coming even from the same
pre-compiled library, simplifies the implementation of this function
search mechanism. As a consequence, it is sufficient to compare func-
tions at a binary level, with fixed and encoded instructions, rather
than at a higher level by analyzing the behavior of the function as it
is, for example, done by the BinDiff tool (available at [45]). Since the
location of the function is known in the base firmware image, we can
extract its byte sequence and try to locate the same sequence in the
new target firmware.
The biggest problem with this are relocations: the linker adapts
some of the immediate values used in instructions. For example, off-
sets in call instructions depend on the destination’s function address
as well as the call’s instruction location. Both of these might be differ-
ent in distinct targets and, therefore, the offset is likely also different.
Similar situations occur for other instructions with code offsets or




with masking out of
all immediate values
in instructions.
tain relocations and which contain fixed values, we chose to mask out
all immediate values for the search as a simple strategy to deal with
this problem. This is done by determining the bits containing imme-
diate values of each read word (32 bits, one instruction) and setting
them to ones. By doing this for the base function and for the data
of the destination firmware, all immediates are identical and not part
of the comparison anymore. The remaining structures, that means
the sequence of instructions and used registers, still contain enough
information to identify most functions uniquely.
A second problem is that we do only know the starting address of
functions but not their length. Due to jumps in the assembly code
and multiple return instructions used for different code paths of the
function, it is not trivial to determine the correct end of a function.
However, we need this information to generate a search sequence for
a function containing exactly all its instructions. As a result, we can
only create a search sequence not perfectly matching the length of
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the function. If it is too short, multiple other functions will match,
if it is too long, it will exceed the end of the function, leading to no
results as in the new firmware the order of functions might differ. To
solve this issue, the script repeats the function search with different
search string length, starting with a small value which will match the
function for sure. The next iteration is determined with the following
logic, with the maximum search length initialized to the remaining
file size after the function:
• Unique match: found the function, return match position
• Multiple matches: double search sequence length, limit with
maximum search length
• No match: set maximum search length to current length mi-
nus one, new length is arithmetic mean between last matching
length and maximum search length
In addition to the stop condition of a unique match, we stop the
search when multiple matches were found for the current maximal
length or no matches were found for the minimal length. In other
words, this is done whenever multiple matches are found for one
length but no matches for one more instruction in the search sequence.
In this case, it is not possible to conclude the correct match with the
algorithm, either the function is not present (in the same form) in the
new target or two functions only differ in the immediate values used
in their instructions.
For a complete wrapper header transfer, the script repeats this for
every function declared in the header. It then generates the new wrap-
per from the base wrapper and the obtained mapping between the
functions in the base firmware and the new target firmware.
9.3.2 Limitations
Obviously, the described method to transfer the wrapper header from
one firmware to another only works for functions. Other symbols like




symbols have to be
identified by hand
for now.
the data declared in the wrapper will be the data encountered while
reverse engineering the functions in the wrapper and these locations
are known, thanks to the automatic transfer scripts, it is not complex
to locate the data addresses by hand afterwards. Target locations for
the patch code and data also need to adapted by hand for a new
target.
In addition, we saw that the implementation can return without
a unique match for a function. The algorithm cannot assign an ad-
dress to such functions. If it could restrict the possible addresses to a
small set with a size smaller than a threshold, for example up to four
possible locations, it will indicate these in the generated wrapper to
simplify the necessary search by hand.
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Found functions Multiple candidates
Figure 11: Percentage of automatically detected functions. Table 16 defines
the scenarios and gives the exact numbers.
9.3.3 Matching performance
In this section, we evaluate the matching performance, meaning how
well the automatic detection works in different cases. For this, we
ran the wrapper transfer scripts on different new targets, with the
main target firmware of this thesis as base firmware: version M3.12.15
for the Asus PadFone Infinity 2 (A86). At the time of this evaluation,
89 symbols were declared in the wrapper header. 74 of these were
functions, 2 define the memory locations to place patch code and
data, 5 indicate the position of version strings and the remaining 8
are variables of the firmware.
Table 16 lists the performance results of the function matching. Fig-
ure 11 additionally visualizes the percentages of found functions and
functions with candidates given for the different targets, with the tar-
gets referring to the ones of the table.
Table 16: Automated porting results to different targets, from the base firm-
ware M3.12.15 for the Asus PadFone Infinity 2 (A86), 74 declared
functions
Same phone Same SoC 1 Same SoC 2 Other SoC 1 Other SoC 2
Phone Asus PadFone Google LG G2 OnePlus Asus ZenFone 2
Infinity 2 (A86) Nexus 5 (D802) One Laser (ZE601KL)
Version M3.15.4 2.0.50.2.28 1.0.190036 DI.3.0.c6-00241 1.16.40.1524
SoC MSM8974 MSM8974 MSM8974 MSM8974AC MSM8939
Found Functions 65 63 66 29 30
Multiple candidates 2 5 2 8 7
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We can see that for the same phone a large portion of the labeled
functions is detected in another firmware version (roughly 88 %, re-
spectively almost 91 % if we also count functions with candidates sug-
gested). Running the automated porting for another phone with the
same SoC results in approximately the same amount of matched func-
tions. This is because Qualcomm ships large parts of the firmware pre-
compiled in libraries to the manufactures for their SoCs and therefore
our algorithm, working by direct instruction compare, works well.
On the other hand, if we do the wrapper transfer for a target with
a different chip, many libraries will be compiled again to adapt to theThe tool works well
if the base and the
target firmware are





internals of the SoC and, therefore, loose the instruction level similar-
ity as the compiler has some freedom in translating the source code
to machine level code. This explains the significantly lower matching
rates for these targets of ~40 %, respectively 50 % if we include func-
tions with suggested candidates. Since the matches include important
functions like memset and memcpy, the scripts can at least provide a
starting point for the reverse engineering.
An example of found function suggestions is a pair of a function
to cipher and the corresponding decipher function. Their implemen-
tations contain indeed the same instructions and only differ by the
called functions (which are again similar). As a consequence, our
script finds both functions in the new target firmware as candidates
for both base functions and the ambiguity has to be resolved manu-
ally.
10
I M P L E M E N T E D P R O J E C T S
We developed a couple of firmware modifications to test the frame-
work, exemplary demonstrate its functions and make first use of it.
As it can be seen in Table 17, they range from simple test patches
(func_counter_snprintf ) over tools to simplify debugging and reverse
engineering (for example mem_access) up to real final applications
(lte_mac, ...).
It is possible to reuse already developed patches by including them
in another patch project. This is utilized by the all_app project to bun-
dle all the different projects into a single patched firmware which
supports all features included in an Android application that we im-
plemented. This app realizes a user interface showing data sent by
the patched modem and allows the user to send inputs to the custom
code inside the modem.
10.1 information exchange
Before looking at the implemented projects, we now have a detailed
look on how the modem communicates with the user space applica-
tion since the same mechanism is used for all of the projects and can
also be used as basis for information exchange for new patch projects. Communication
with patch code is
based on the QMI
protocol.
Figure 12 shows the involved entities and protocols. The modem
communicates with an Android kernel module over Qualcomm’s QMI
protocol. This kernel driver then interfaces to user space applications,
allowing them to send messages to the modem or receive messages
from it. We explain all details of this figure in the following sections.
Table 17: Implemented projects
Name Description
func_counter_snprintf Counting of calls of standard C functions,
forwarding of snprintf outputs
mem_access Direct access (read & write) to the modem memory
lte_mac LTE MAC Layer messages sniffing
lte_sec LTE security: key extraction, cryptography functions
channel_estimation Access to LTE channel estimation matrices
all_app Metaproject to combine all patches used by the app
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Figure 12: Information exchange with patch code in the modem
10.1.1 Using the QMI protocol
It would be possible to realize communication between the main sys-
tem and the modem by directly accessing the memory regions shared
between them. However, we would then need mechanisms to signal
new messages, indicate which memory areas can be used again as the
message we wrote there is completely processed and so on. Also, we
would need to be careful not to use memory ranges currently needed
by the modem’s original operation.
As the modem’s firmware already implements all these functions
with a stack of protocols as seen in Section 7.5, it is much simpler
to reuse these. Therefore, we base our communication on the QMI
implementation.
On the other hand, registering a new service with the QMI imple-
mentation on the modem is complex since a large set of structures de-
scribing the service and all possible messages is required, with many
data fields each. To generate the correct structures for an own QMI
service, lots of reverse engineering work to identify the meaning and
encoding of all of these data structures is necessary.
Luckily, the modem contains a ping test service solely used for de-
bugging purposes but active in all observed firmware versions. ItAdding an own
message type to
QMI is complex,




supports a message type with an array of 8,192 bytes as a data field.
Normally, the modem replies to this message with an echo message
containing the same data. This allows us to overwrite the handler for
this message and encode our own messages inside this array. Unfor-
tunately, then we cannot use the message type of QMI anymore to
differentiate between message destinations, as all messages need to
be sent to the ping test service. Also, the decoding into different data
fields with appropriate types of Qualcomm’s code cannot be used.
As a result, we overwrite the receive function for this data echo
message of the QMI test service and tunnel our own protocol through
it. As Table 18 indicates, this protocol only adds a destination ser-
vice identifier to the raw message content. The different custom ser-
vices are responsible for encoding and decoding their data in the
remaining data bytes. If a message is larger than the available length
(8,192 bytes), it has to be split into multiple messages. However, for
most purposes the available size should be sufficient.
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The modem code implementing this protocol only needs a table
which associates handler functions with service identification num-
bers. If this is configured, incoming messages will be automatically
sent to the appropriate handler function which can then further de-
code the service specific message content. This handler function also
gets a pointer to a buffer where it can write a response message. It
will be sent back directly after the handler function returns. In ad-
dition, patch code can always send QMI indications (described in
Section 7.5.2) to the main system. In Figure 12, these are indicated
by dashed arrows in contrast to the solid drawn arrows of the re-
quest/response message path.
10.1.2 Kernel module
Since the QMI server on the Android system is only accessible from
kernel space, we included a kernel module responsible to forward







fore, it connects to Qualcomm’s QMI kernel implementation and reg-
isters to receive all messages from the ping test service. On the other
side, the user space application can communicate with it over usual
device files.
It was desired to keep the kernel driver code as simple as possible
to reduce the possibility of critical kernel errors and to keep the mod-
ule as flexible as possible. Therefore, the driver only implements the
message routing between the device file interface for the user space
applications and the QMI interface to the modem. It forwards mes-
sages as they are received and not modified, all protocols have to be
implemented in user space. As a result, the kernel driver is indepen-
dent of the used tunneling protocol. However, only communication
with the QMI ping test service is possible and no other requests can
be issued.
The driver creates two device files. Reading /dev/seemoo_qmi_status
returns all available status and error messages from the driver as hu-
man readable ASCII text. The /dev/seemoo_qmi_data file is used for the
actual message passing. Every read returns the complete content of
the next available message or nothing if no more messages are avail-
able. A write to this file is interpreted as a new message and all
data bytes written in a single write operation will be sent as one QMI
message.
Table 18: Message structure to tunnel messages through QMI ping service
Byte 0 1 2 3 4 ... MSG_SIZE - 1
Content SVC_ID Service specific message
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10.1.2.1 QMI service identification problem
As seen in Section 7.5.2, QMI uses two numbers to identify a service
instance: a service ID distinguishes between different types of ser-
vices (0xF for the ping service) and an instance id (1 for the modem)
differs between instances of the same service.
The ping service exists on multiple subsystems of the smartphone
and not only the modem. Unfortunately, Qualcomm assigned theThe identification
information of the





same instance ID to many of them, making the identification scheme
not unique anymore. The Android kernel implementation simply
returns the first fitting service it finds when requesting connection
to a service which was not the desired instance running in the mo-
dem. Note that the QMI message router uses information stored in
the handle structure returned by the connection function, the IDs are
only used to identify the service in the connection phase. Therefore,
once a connection with the right service is established, all messages
will be routed correctly.
As a quick fix for this bug, we changed the connection function
to return the last found service instance instead, in case multiple
matching service instances are found. This works since the instances
are always found in the same order and the modem is the last of
these. However, a cleaner solution would be to try all the services by
sending a test message and concluding from the response message
whether or not it is the modem’s instance, either by checking if we
received an echo or by adding a special test response for this purpose
in the modem code.
10.1.2.2 Indications and request/response message bug
Qualcomm’s QMI server implementation, contained in the Android
kernel, crashes when responses to request messages and indications
arrive interleaved at the same registered client. To overcome this prob-
lem, our kernel module registers two clients with the server. The first
of these is used for the request/response scheme while the second
client handle is only used to receive indications and to send registra-
tion messages for these.
As a consequence, the kernel driver needs to know whether a mes-
sage is a normal request or a registration for an indication to choose
the appropriate client handle. For this, on the user space interface, we
use the highest bit of the service ID. This breaks a bit what we said in
the introduction. Now, the first bit of byte four (the data is encoded
in little endian) of the message has a special meaning and the kernel
driver is no longer independent of the messages content. However,
only this bit is interpreted, the rest of the encoding remains in user
space. The driver also sets this bit for incoming indication messages,
allowing the user space application to differ between response mes-
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sages and indications. Consequently, the service ID should contain
only 31 bits and not use the highest bit of the data word.
10.1.3 User space implementation
We implemented the user space code as a usual Android application







file interface to the kernel module. It abstracts from the interface
itself and the used protocol. Other classes can add a listener for the
status and error messages from the driver. Service implementation
can register a listener for a specific service ID for incoming response
messages and another listener for indications. Sending a message can
be requested easily by a method call with the destination service and
payload as parameters. Remember that it is the task of the services to
encode and decode the actual data it wants to transmit in the message
in an appropriate way.
Thereby, we now have communication between a patch service im-
plementation on the modem and a corresponding service implemen-
tation in the Android application.
10.2 framework usage example
The purpose of the func_counter_snprintf project is to give a simple
example of how to use the framework. During the development, we





fore, it includes examples of all features supported by the framework.
It consist of two parts. First, it hooks standard C functions and adds
call counters to them. These counter values are sent back as response
to a QMI request message. Second, it modifies the snprintf function
used by the modem firmware to format various status strings such
that, on every call of this function, a QMI indication with the result-
ing formatted string is sent, in case a client previously registered for
this. The counters and the snprintf messages can be viewed in the
developed Android application.
Listing 5 shows some example messages obtained by the snprintf
function hook, only a small set of different message from the output is
printed here. We can see that, even in the firmware version deployed
on customer devices, a lot of parts of the firmware use the snprintf
function to print debug and status messages. In line one to five, we
can see location based information. Lines seven to nine show internal
messages from the LTE and Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
(WCDMA) modules. The remaining messages contain network cell
discover and selection information.
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10.3 modem memory access
In Section 6.2.1, we saw that access rights are given to different sub-
systems and protection units prohibit access from one subsystem to
a memory region of another subsystem (except for shared regions
between these two entities). As a result, the Android system cannot
access internal memory data of the modem during runtime. How-
ever, for reverse engineering it is crucial to be able to look at memory
data of the system during runtime, for example to observe values
assigned to variables or to find destinations of jumps to a variable
function pointer.
Therefore, we implemented a service allowing to access memory
from the modem’s processor. It enables to issue requests for a mem-With the
mem_access project,
we can read and
write memory from





ory address together with the amount of bytes to read. The service
implementation then reads these bytes and sends back a response
message with the data. In addition, it supports write requests. For
this, a message with the start address and the bytes to write is sent.
The modem patch code then writes this data to its memory. Note that
the service does not check the memory addresses passed to it. The
user is responsible to only use memory regions for which the modem
has the appropriate access rights for the requested operation.
Listing 5: Captured example snprintf output messages
1 TPC: Lat:47.000000, Lon:4.000000, Alt:0.000000, Punc:700000.000000,
↪→ AltUnc:10000.000000
2 TPC: Sub:1, TimeValid:0, Wk:0, msec:0
3 TPC: SendPosReport: TimeTickMsec=77242, GpsTimeValid=0, GPSWk=0, GPSTow=0
4 TPC: SendPosReport: PosValid=1, Lat=47.000000, Lon=4.000000,
↪→ Punc=700000.0
5 TPC: Sending position update to user:ALE
6
7 [ LTE: pci 279 fcn 1501 ]
8 [ WCDMA: psc 144 fcn 10564 ]
9 [ LTE: pci 488 fcn 2825 ]
10
11 Cell Change ClosestCellID:20 20 ClosestPosEst:20 21500000.000000
12 ME updating LTE CellDB: Valid=1, MCC=208,MNC=10, cellID=ac06, tac=c15c
13 ME updating LTE CellDB: Valid=1, MCC=208,MNC=10, GlbCellID=44038,
↪→ PhyCellID=488, tac=49500
14 MCC:208, MNC:10, CellId:44038, Physical CellId:488, TAC:49500, DL
↪→ Freq:6300
15 MCC:208, MNC:10, LAC:49542, CellId:31702, Band:3, BsIc:50, Arfcn:612
16 GSM PhyId, Bsic:50
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Due to the used communication scheme with the main system (Sec-
tion 10.1.1), the maximal amount of memory read or written at once
is limited to:
8192 bytes (maximum message size)
− 4 bytes (SVC_ID)
− 4 bytes (start address)
− 4 bytes (length)
= 8180 bytes
Multiple requests have to be sent if a larger amount of data needs to
be read or written. Since all messages contain the complete memory
address, we can issue these fast after each other and even if they are
received by the modem out of order due to the underlying QMI proto-
col, it will still process the requests correctly. The developed Android
application also supports this service, either by directly showing the
read bytes in the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and typing the bytes
to write or by reading from and writing the data to files (Intel HEX
and raw binary data files are supported).
10.3.1 Security aspects
Obviously, this service breaks most of the modem’s security mech-
anisms. An Android user space application gets the same memory
access permissions as the basebands code itself. Consequently, a
malicious application accessing this service could perform many un-
wanted things, like monitoring all network traffic or accessing encryp-
tion keys. However, the patch is only intended for debugging and This patch
introduces large
security issues. It is




reverse engineering and not for a large set of phones in real every-
day use. An attacker (if he would really exist) could only get access
to test equipment used during reverse engineering without sensitive
user data being processed.
The same discussion holds for other patch projects implemented
in this thesis. Especially, the lte_sec project (Section 10.5) also opens
doors for attackers by extracting cryptography keys.
10.3.2 Outlook: Debugger
Often it is hard to identify what a piece of assembly code does and to
infer its purpose by solely statically looking at the instructions. With
the presented mem_access service, it is possible to read memory loca-
tions during runtime, leading to first dynamical analysis possibilities.
Unfortunately, we cannot see the memory content at a specific time
step, for example when the processor is executing a certain function
of the code. Also, local variables of a function on the stack are al-
most impossible to observe and we cannot read parameters passed to
functions in processor registers at all.
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Therefore, a complete remote debugger implementation offering
single step execution, execution breakpoints, access to the current
processor state (registers) and similar common debugger functional-
ity would be nice to have.
Regrettably, implementing it is quite complex due to Hexagon’s
hardware and software thread execution. We need further details on
how these are managed and how the used QuRT operating system
interacts with them to implement a proper debugger. Also, the sup-
port of the DSPs architecture for debuggers needs to be reviewed in
detail as Qualcomm keeps the documentation of this in the reference
manual minimal (compare [33]).
At last, the modem system sends RF signals at high power in li-
censed bands. Breaking inside signal processing code might be dan-
gerous and leave the device in a sending state with radiation of un-
intended signals. As a consequence, it could disturb the operation of
the mobile network and the service quality for other users might be
influenced.
Note that similar cases could occur for all kinds of modifications on
the modem’s firmware as presented in this work. Modified devices
should only be operated in a laboratory environment and turned off
whenever no experiments are conducted.
10.4 lte mac layer frame sniffing
The lte_mac project’s objective is to get access to messages from the
LTE MAC layer in order to be able to analyze these. It allows us to
observe messages send in a real deployed network and to see how






between a device and
a base station in
Wireshark.
enables the analysis of MAC layer communication on cheap devices,
removing the need for special development equipment, one of the
main purposes guiding this thesis.
Possible applications include:
• Understand (better) how LTE works by looking at actual data,
also for teaching purposes
• Demonstrate what a malicious attacker could do with access to
modem firmwares (all user data is passed here)
• Study differences between deployed networks (for example per
operator)
• Analyze network problems
• See how a network reacts to attacks (e.g. send on resources
assigned to other users, try to authenticate as other user, more
sophisticated attack scenarios, ...)
• Observe what a device really sends to a network (at a low level)
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Some of these applications require additional modifications of the
firmware. We see that this sniffing project can be useful in many
different scenarios, the list contains only some ideas from the author,
many more applications might exist.
Figure 13 shows an example capture of LTE MAC frames in Wire-
shark obtained with this project. The capture includes the initial con-
nection and configuration negotiation of the phone with the network
as well as receiving an SMS message. The figure focuses on a few
interesting messages, other frames are omitted for better readability.
Frames in the uplink are highlighted in purple in contrast to the white
downlink frames. The detailed packet window displays the first RAR
message to get an idea of how the data can be analyzed.
Before the connection establishment of the device, we can see Sys-
tem Information Block (SIB) messages with configuration parameters
of the network. In frame three to 31, the device then performs a
RACH procedure and after that negotiates connection parameters
with the network, including the used security features (frames 30
and 31). This is followed by a phase of inactivity, we can see paging
requests for other devices in frames 53 and 54. In frame 56 then the
device received a paging request for itself, triggering it to establish
an active connection to the network with a RACH procedure. In this
connection, the network then delivers the SMS message to it. Note
that we shortened the message delivery here and consists of many
more messages than shown. The capture also includes unsuccessful
message transmissions. For example, in the second RACH procedure,
the preamble (Msg1) is sent three times. Similarly, the UE repeats the
RRC connection request (Msg3) (frames 61 and 62).
10.4.1 Limitations
Only MAC frames intended for the device are forwarded as the PHY
layer solely listens on the resource blocks assigned to the device or
for broadcast messages (remember the resource grid from Chapter 3).
By reverse engineering the details of the physical layer, it should be We can only observe
messages intended
for the device, no
other network traffic.
possible to modify it to receive all messages from the connected base
station on the same channel (downlink). Unfortunately, since LTE
uses a different modulation scheme in the uplink as in the downlink
and for FDD LTE the uplink uses distinct frequency resources, it is
impossible to receive uplink messages send by other phones in the
network. The only way to overcome this is to largely rewriting the
baseband’s firmware with demodulation capabilities for the uplink
modulation scheme. As a result, this work focuses on giving access
to the MAC layer communication between a single device and the
network, instead of monitoring the whole communication in the net-
work.
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Figure 13: LTE MAC sniffing capture in Wireshark
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10.4.2 Choice of the target layer
The main aim of the lte_mac patch is to enable research work directly
on the MAC layer but more applications are possible. In Chapter 3,
we introduced the protocol layering of LTE. The MAC layer resides
directly on top of the PHY layer. As a result, MAC frames include
the data of all higher layers and can therefore also be analyzed by
decoding the MAC messages. For example, this patch also intercepts
layer 3 messages as the Azenqos tool presented in the related work
section can do. However, this requires to implement the complete
decoding of the messages and all intermediate layers. Even though
this can be done easily by using an existing implementation, we use
a Wireshark dissector for this. In case a project specifically targets a
higher layer, it should also be considered to let the modem do the
decoding and to intercept the messages directly on this layer. This
could, for example, be beneficial in a case where the whole project
needs to run directly on the smartphone over a long time and is power
constraint (on battery) or when high throughput data needs to be
analyzed. On the other hand, in most cases it is sufficient to use the
MAC layer sniffing also for projects targeting higher layers.
With this argumentation, the reader might ask why not to start
even lower in the stack then, in the physical layer. Here, we would The lowest feasible







get the same information plus the data from the PHY layer. First,
we would have to implement decoding of the data ourselves as all de-
coders known to the author start from the MAC layer upwards. Then,
the outputs and inputs to the physical layer are sample values of an
analog signal with a bandwidth of 20 MHz or even more with carrier
aggregation in recent LTE releases (up to 100 MHz aggregated band-
width from LTE Release 10 onwards). Forwarding all these samples
in real-time leads to many QMI messages and processing them would
consume a large amount of resources on the main processor which is
not optimized for signal processing. Next, the PHY layer processing
has to meet strict timing constraints which are hard to respect with
our still limited knowledge of the modem’s firmware internals and,
as a result, might get violated if we inject code in these functions.
10.4.3 Sniffing scheme
The sniffing project uses the mechanism developed for all projects in
Section 10.1 to communicate with the Android user space application.
The application’s code can then process the MAC frame data. Analyz-
ing the MAC traffic on the screen of the phone is rather inconvenient.
Instead of processing the data directly on the phone, we included a
feature into the app to forward the frames to another device in the
network over the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). The Wireshark net-
work analyzer tool includes a dissectors to analyze LTE MAC frames
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Figure 14: LTE MAC sniffing setup
[42] and the packets are sent in the format this dissector expects. Con-







the incoming packets on the network interface and all its analysis
features can be used. Figure 14 illustrates this scheme.
In Figure 13, we see that some PDCP frames are not analyzed
higher than this layer since they are encrypted, for example frame
52 as security was enabled in frames 30 and 31 before. Luckily, the
Wireshark PDCP dissector is also able to decrypt these, if the correct
keys are configured in its settings. These can be obtained by run-
ning the patch for cryptography key extraction, which we present in
Section 10.5, together with the MAC layer sniffing and entering the
required keys in Wireshark. Unfortunately, neither the MAC nor the
PDCP dissector directly allow to pass the keys in metadata of the
frames they process, meaning they cannot be passed directly to Wire-
shark but have to be entered by hand. If this is a problem, it can
be overcome by extending one of the dissectors, favorably the MAC
dissector, with this capability. The PDCP dissector already includes
the needed functions to set the keys from other dissectors.
10.4.4 Implementation
In this section, we discuss how this patch was realized. Remember
that the aim of the project is to capture MAC frames. Therefore, we
need to collect the data at the low end of the MAC layer, at the inter-
face with the PHY layer. As a consequence, we first need to figure out
how this interfacing is done in Qualcomm’s modem firmware. We can
divide this into two subtasks: downlink frames which are received by
the MAC layer from the physical layer and uplink frames passed in
the opposite direction.
10.4.4.1 Intercepting downlink frames
Frames in the downlink are passed to the MAC layer as a DSM itemDownlink frames are
easy to intercept, all
required values are
passed to a single
function.
(as introduced in Section 7.3.2). This item contains all bytes of the
received MAC frame. A pointer to this element is passed as a part
of a data structure containing additional meta-information on the re-
ceived frame, like the time it was received as system frame number
and subframe number.
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The patch overwrites the main frame processing function in the
MAC layer. It gets a pointer to the previously described data struc-
ture as parameter. With this, we have all relevant data and can for-
ward the metadata and the bytes extracted from the DSM item to
the Android application. This then converts it to a packet compati-
ble to Wireshark’s LTE MAC protocol. Especially, it needs to convert
the metadata from the modem’s internal representation, consisting of
two structures packed in two 32 bit words, into the protocols encod-
ing. For this, it first extracts the different fields from the data words.
Additionally, in case of the RNTI type value, a mapping between the
values used by the modem and the values used by the Wireshark
protocol is required.
10.4.4.2 Intercepting uplink frames
Intercepting messages in the other direction, sent from the MAC to
the PHY layer, is not as simple as for the downlink frames, the patch
code consists of a total of 16 overwritten functions in order to achieve
the desired functionality. This is because the frame is not constructed
as a single array of bytes by the MAC layer but instead passed in
parts. The physical layer is then responsible to build the final bytes
to transmit during the sending phase.
This is implemented by a queue of “tasks”, each of these specifying
data to be written to the frame. The queue is ordered and tasks can The mechanism to
pass uplink frames




only be appended to the end, meaning that tasks are executed in the
sequence they are created and the bytes of the frame are written in
exactly this order. To still allow the MAC layer to first write data in
a different pattern, functions to reserve tasks without adding actual
data and corresponding functions to fill them with information at a
later point in time exist. This is, for example, used to write the frames
Service Data Unit (SDU) before building the MAC header.
There exist different types of tasks for various purposes as listed in
Table 19. Thereby, for example, padding bits can simply be specified
by the number of bits instead of copying a large number of zero bytes.
Table 19: MAC uplink frame generation tasks
Task Description
Gather copies an array of data bytes
Fill same as gather task but optimized for
small amounts of data (maximal 16 bytes)
DSM copies data from a DSM item
Padding adds a number of padding bits (all zero)
Cipher ciphers the bytes written by the next task
Done pseudo task, sets a done flag
to indicate the frame is complete
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The cipher type is a special task which does not write bytes itself.
Instead, it indicates that the data of the next task should be ciphered
with certain parameters. This is needed as the higher PDCP layer
in Qualcomm’s stack only marks data to be ciphered but does not
perform the actual cryptographic operation. The cipher operation is
postponed to the building of the final frame in the PHY layer. For
this, it also implements a key store with a corresponding function to
add new cipher keys which are then referenced by a key index in the
cipher tasks.
Even more task types exist in the firmware. However, they are
either not used by the observed firmware versions or internally map
to one of these tasks.
To patch the firmware and sniff the uplink frames, we modified
all these task creation functions, including their reserve and informa-
tion adding derivates. The patch code implements a copy of the task
queue. The function hooks add or modify the tasks in this queue,
in addition to calling the original function. On creation of a “done”
task, our code processes the content of the queue and builds the MAC
frame’s byte data by evaluating the tasks. It then forwards the result-
ing data over the QMI based communication scheme to the user space
application.
10.4.4.3 Metadata for uplink frames
Unfortunately, the tasks contain no metadata information for the de-
scribed frame. At least the send time in terms of a LTE system frame
number and subframe number is crucial for a meaningful analysis
of the data, allowing to put them in reference to received downlink





the arrival time in the user space app due to varying latencies of
the QMI protocol used for communication. Also, an offset between
the times of processing received frames and the construction of up-
link frames exist since downlink frames are processed after they were
sent over the air interface whereas uplink frames obviously have to
be built before the LTE system time at which they are supposed to be
transmitted.
An initialization function called before each MAC uplink frame
generation exists. It gets a value at which the frame is supposed to
be sent in a unit of some timer ticks. Note that this value has a fixed
increase per time (19200 ticks/ms) but no relation to the current LTE
system time.
We can recover this relation by utilizing a detail of the LTE specifi-
cation: in the LTE RACH procedure, a RRC connection request mes-
sage (Msg3) in the uplink has to follow a RAR message (Msg2) in the
downlink exactly six subframes later. Additionally, these are the first
messages of each data exchange between a UE and an eNodeB. With
this information, we could generate a mapping function to conclude
10.5 lte cryptography key extraction 85
the LTE system times from the timing values of the task initialization
function.
The timer value can be shifted slightly during operation by the
timing advance feature of LTE adjusting send times to take care of
signal propagation delays to the base station. As this is limited to a
maximum of approximately 667, 7us < 1ms (one LTE subframe), the
mapping function can deal with this by just placing decision intervals
for the LTE times carefully. Therefore, it does not need to keep track
of the current timing advance value. This calculation is implemented
in the Android application, the modem firmware patch directly for-
wards the timer value. With this, after a successful RACH procedure,
the app is also able to forward uplink messages including LTE system
frame and subframe numbers to a device running Wireshark.
10.4.5 RACH preamble
The RACH preamble (Msg1) is not a real MAC layer message but
rather a special mechanism of the physical layer to offer random ac-
cess of devices to the network to allow them to request a new connec-
tion. On the other hand, the sending process of it is initiated by the
MAC layer and, therefore, it makes sense to also see these messages in
the analysis. The Wireshark LTE MAC dissector also supports RACH
preambles by setting a special metadata flag and leaving the message
content empty. Therefore, the patch code overwrites two more func-
tions, one used to send a RACH preamble and one used to retry in
case the first attempt failed.
10.5 lte cryptography key extraction
The lte_sec projects allows to extract cryptography keys used by LTE
for encryption and integrity protection. Obtaining these allows, for The lte_sec project
gives access to
session keys. These
can, for example, be
used to decrypt data
in intercepted MAC
messages.
example, to decrypt payload data of the LTE MAC frames from the
lte_mac project, allowing further applications when these two patches
are combined as we are then able to analyze all of the data contained
in the MAC frame. It can also be used as base for generating own
MAC frames with payload data, useful to test new MAC or higher
layer approaches. Another use case is to implement attack scenarios
with an attacker having access to the modem, allowing him to extract
the keys and impersonate the target’s identity, showing only a single
kind of many severe attacks possible with the ability to modify the
modem’s firmware code.
To perform the key extraction, the patch project overwrites the
firmwares key generation function and forwards the generated key
together with parameters of the function determining the data it will
be used for (NAS/RRC/user data), the purpose (integrity or cipher-
ing) and the target ciphering or integrity algorithm of the key.
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In addition to this, we modified the firmware functions for cipher-
ing, deciphering and integrity MAC calculation and our patch codeThe patch can also






can inform the user space application on calls including all metadata
needed as input for the calculation operations: bearer ID, count value,
message length and the direction of the data (uplink/downlink).
The user space code can choose from a variety of options when
registering for the LTE security patch service of the modem. First, it
can define about which function calls it wants to be informed. For
the actual cryptographic operations, it can then further choose if the
used key should be included and whether or not the input and output
data should be part of the messages (all independently), reducing the
communication overhead to the required minimum.
Listing 6 shows example output messages with all options enabled
for cryptographic operations but only the resulting key for the gener-
ation function. At the beginning, interestingly, the modem firmware
generates keys for all possible algorithms of the LTE specification.
Logically, the cryptography functions only use the keys for the algo-
rithms chosen for the communication. We can also see that the output
of decipher calls, without the last four bytes containing the transmit-
ted authentication code, prepended with the count value, is passed as
input to the integrity protection function in order to check the MAC
of the message.
The listing contains only a few messages for brevity, in a real LTE
communication many more MACs are generated and many messages
are ciphered. Also, new keys are generated under certain conditions.
Depending on the cause that triggered this key generation, the old
keys might still be used for a while before the new keys replace them.
In Section 10.4.4.2, we describe that the PDCP ciphering for the
uplink is delegated to the final frame building step inside the PHY
layer. There, an independent set of cryptographic functions is used
and, as a result, cipher operations in the uplink are not seen by this
patch.
As already mentioned in Section 10.4, one use case of this patch
is the combination with MAC layer sniffing allowing to decrypt pro-
tected content in the intercepted messages.
10.6 lte channel estimation
In the LTE background introduction (Section 3.2.3), we saw that the
LTE UE has to estimate the current channel to the base station contin-
uously. This results in information on how the transmission channel
changes the phase and amplitude of different frequency components
of the signal, which maps to how the symbols of the subcarriers are
influenced in case of the used OFDM. This characterization is done
for each pair of antennas of the UE and the base station. When, for
example, 2x2 MIMO is used, four distinct channels exist and need to
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be estimated. This data is then used to compensate the channel’s in-







to reconstruct the symbol that was originally sent by the transmitter.
Moreover, the UE bases the channel information values sent back to
the base station to optimize resource allocations in the cell on the
channel estimates.
In addition to these primary use cases, it is possible to leverage the
channel estimates to derive other information which is not directly
obvious. As the signals spread from the transmitter to the UE through
the area around these and, for example, get reflected on objects in
between, the channel characteristics contain information about the
environment.
Listing 6: LTE key extraction output messages
1 new algorithm key for RRC_INT, used algorithm EIA1:
↪→ 315A6F461457AA158CA7F25C4C506D06
2 new algorithm key for RRC_INT, used algorithm EIA2:
↪→ 4A3DC770975265CF0A62642A796D97EA
3 new algorithm key for RRC_INT, used algorithm EIA3:
↪→ 9898D1C2AA988B406670B9656AEB23BF
4 new algorithm key for RRC_ENC, used algorithm EEA1:
↪→ D90C0A1DEC414BA89A7C77E6EB466F5E
5 new algorithm key for RRC_ENC, used algorithm EEA2:
↪→ 824B9118660B0CCC211FB7AF076A89A9
6 new algorithm key for RRC_ENC, used algorithm EEA3:
↪→ D4E43C747D47B8F67E033B6331417B08
7 new algorithm key for UP_ENC, used algorithm EEA1:
↪→ D5728315F0ABD010B8D80DF79912DACE
8 new algorithm key for UP_ENC, used algorithm EEA2:
↪→ F64E8F372D22A0B2410C901E5E3958C0
9 new algorithm key for UP_ENC, used algorithm EEA3:
↪→ A20198CD3E3B3565980EEBF61ED7A71C
10
11 MAC-i call uplink: algorithm: EIA2, bearer: 0, count: 7, message bytes: 3
12 used key: 4A3DC770975265CF0A62642A796D97EA
13 input message: 071400
14 output data: EAAE8E39
15
16 decipher call: algorithm: EEA2, bearer: 0, count: 7, message bytes: 28
17 used key: 824B9118660B0CCC211FB7AF076A89A9
18 input message: 87020DF253015134EC107FC05BA95A4FBC3D4EF3E0B81ED1630BAA8A
19 output data: 26101540023002EEC300300C800A1184648031E0284B45809E0260D8
20
21 MAC-i call downlink: algorithm: EIA2, bearer: 0, count: 7, message
↪→ bytes: 25
22 used key: 4A3DC770975265CF0A62642A796D97EA
23 input message: 0726101540023002EEC300300C800A1184648031E0284B4580
24 output data: 9E0260D8
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Many research projects focused on making use of CSI data from







these from commonly used Intel WiFi cards [16]. Example areas are
indoor localization and activity respectively event detection, a list of
papers is available at the page of the extraction tool at [15]. Some of
these ideas might be also applicable to LTE CSI data. However, the
conditions for LTE channels are different to the ones found for WiFi:
• The distance between sender and receiver is longer.
• A larger area is covered.
• Usually no line of sight exists between the stations.
As a consequence, an LTE channel is usually exposed to a larger vari-
ation than the WiFi channels. Its channel estimation contains infor-
mation about a larger area but with that also less details and it gets
harder to conclude the precise cause of an observed change. There-
fore, some applications developed for WiFi might not work with LTE
CSI data or at least large adaptations to the algorithms could be re-
quired. On the other hand, especially due to the larger area covered,
new use cases can be created. For example, it might be possible to
monitor the traffic on a street between an UE and a base station.
With this patch project we intend to provide a tool for LTE CSIs
similar to the presented WiFi CSI tool and enable research in this
direction based on LTE.
10.6.1 Implementation
Due to the continuous updating of the channel matrix estimation,
the implementation needs to be careful at which moment it fetches
the data. Reading during the same time as a new matrix write will
lead to unusable data as a part of it contains already new values
while the rest might still be the previous data. There is no way toThe moment of
reading the CSI data
has to be chosen
with care to avoid
memory conflicts.
We use a function
which generates
reports for the base
station.
detect this situation or to find out which values were already updated.
Depending on the concrete implementation and configuration, the
firmware might even crash if a read and write to the same item of the
channel matrix occur.
As a result, we need to find a point in the firmware where it is safe
to read the channel estimation. Logically, this is the case where the
channel state feedback report messages for the base station are gener-
ated, as this also needs to access the channel information. The base-
band code does this in a function referred to as “CSF::CALLBACK”
(for channel state feedback callback) in strings of the firmware. This
function is called once per LTE subframe, so once per millisecond.
However, it does not generate a report in each call but only when
necessary to fulfill the configuration of the network.
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It also calls another function with the purpose of logging, according
to string messages found in the code directly before it is executed.
We assume that the target of this is the DIAG interface used by the
tools presented in Section 2.2, even though we could not get the data
with any of these. Note that the code calls this function only when
a channel state feedback report is generated and then only every n-
th time, with n being 100 by default. Thus, although the channel
estimation data should be available at the diagnostic interface, the
report interval is far beyond the actual measurement rate and too low
for many applications. For now, it is unclear if it is possible to change
the report interval to a lower value with a command on the exposed
interface.
This is where the patch code presented in this work is advanta-
geous. With our full access to the firmware, we can simply change
the calling frequency of the logging function, fetch the CSI data here
and forward the matrices together with metadata over QMI, at the
rate they are generated. Reading the data at each execution of the
callback function did not lead to further improvement: we read the
same values multiple times, the channel seems to be estimated only
if a report is generated. Thanks to the modified interval value, the
logging function is also called in this case and we can get the data at
the actual measurement rate here.
10.6.2 Output data
The output of this patch is the described channel matrix, respectively
a set of channel vectors. The developed Android app includes func- Our code provides
the CSI to users over
a simple interface.
The developed app
visualizes the data to
get a first
impression.
tionality to visualize this data in different ways as it can be seen in Fig-
ure 15. It allows to get a first idea of how a LTE channel fades in time
and frequency domains and how paths between different antenna
pairs change. We can estimate general characteristics and decide for
what projects the data might be suitable, for example, by observing
variations under static conditions or when moving the phone.
Later, the service can provide the data for a real use case. As all pre-
sented patch service implementations, the Android code implements
a simple interface and allows to register listeners for data updates.
Figure 15 (a) shows the amplitude of all four channels between two
transmit antennas (Tx) of a base station and two receiving antennas
(Rx) of the phone for a network with 15 MHz bandwidth. We can see
that the channels Rx1/Tx1 and Rx2/Tx2 show a similar characteristic.
The signal received by Rx2 from Tx1 is strong for the lower 5 MHz of
the used frequency range and then negligible. The channel from Tx2
to Rx1 behaves inversely, its signal is weak for low frequencies and
gets stronger in the higher 10 MHz.
Figure 15 (b) shows a detailed view of the Rx1/Tx1 channel, in-
cluding its phase. This channel shows why feedback of the channel
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(a) Amplitude of all channels between base station and UE
(b) Amplitude and phase of Rx1/Tx1
(c) Complex value representation of
Rx1/Tx1
Figure 15: Channel estimation plots
conditions to the base station is important: resource blocks around
zero to ten and 22 to 36 of this channel currently have much better
properties for signal transmission than the remaining resources and
therefore, if possible in conjunction with allocations to other users,
transmissions to this UE should occur on the subcarriers of these
blocks. Similarly, Figure 15 (c) shows the complex representation of
the channel coefficients for the same channel.
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P R O B L E M : F I R M WA R E A U T H E N T I C AT I O N
In Section 7.2, we showed that the modem’s firmware image is digi-
tally signed. As only the OEM of a phone has access to the needed
private keys, the previously presented patching framework is not able
to generate such a valid signature and can only be used on devices Modem images are
digitally signed for
most devices. Until
now, we could not
find a way to bypass
this.
with this authentication deactivated. In order to broaden the range
of target devices, we analyzed opportunities which could allow to
bypass this problem and also get execution of modified firmwares
on devices with the signature check enabled. Unfortunately, until
now, we were not able to achieve this goal. We still shortly present
our methods and findings here, as they reveal additional knowledge
about the system and some have the potential to be the basis for a
successful exploit when developed further in the future.
In contrast to previous work, Qualcomm’s firmware code of the
target device seems to be hardened well to us, for example all pa-
rameters passed to externally available interfaces, such as QMI, are
validated, especially the length of the contained values. As a con-
sequence, we expect low chances in finding an exploitable runtime
vulnerability and decided to investigate other attack vectors first.
11.1 configuring protection units
The modem’s firmware in the shared memory cannot be modified
after the authentication process by the HLOS because it is protected
from accesses through a XPU. Thus, the straightforward idea is to
reconfigure those and allow the accesses. Obviously, it is not possible
to configure XPUs from the Linux kernel as this would be equal to
no protection, malicious code with root privileges could also simply
change the XPU configuration.
Therefore, configuration of the protection units is only possible in
the TrustZone from the main processor system. In this trusted exe-
cution environment, the ARM processors can run code for security
critical tasks, isolated from the non-secure code execution of, for ex-
ample, the Android operating system. Analogous to the authenti- XPUs can only be
configured from the
TrustZone. With
exploits it is possible
to gain the needed
rights.
cation of modem code, the TrustZone code needs to be signed such
that no custom code can be executed. This means that it is also not
possible to modify this code.
However, exploits exist allowing to gain full access to TrustZone
implementations. Especially, for the MSM8974 SoC, a vulnerability
and detailed exploit code with an extensive explanation can be found
in [7]. A bug in one of the handlers for commands from the non-
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secure kernel allows to get a zero write primitive. The exploit then
uses this to modify other command handlers to gain an arbitrary
write primitive. Since handler functions for commands are called by
pointers stored in a table, we can now modify these with our crafted
primitive and directly call internal functions of the TrustZone code.
For the details, please refer to the well written original source. The
author also presents ways to execute own instruction in the secure
environment, however, the step to write these to secure memory did
not work stable in our tests and caused the system to reboot in many
cases.
After identifying the interface for configuration of XPUs in the
TrustZone code, this exploit allows us to execute these functions and




rules of the modem.
were, for example, able to successfully configure locks for memory re-
gions in the main memory MPU which are then no longer accessible
from the non-secure world.
Regrettably, this is limited by ownerships of the rules (Section 6.2.1).
Thus, even the TrustZone does not have the required rights to remove
the XPU locks from the modem’s memory regions. We discovered
that for multiple rules owned by the modem only the last rule is en-
forced. It is not possible to place a new rule with access permissions
for the main processor after the modem rules as the last rules in the
main memory MPU are owned by this subsystem. As a consequence,
the straightforward idea of unlocking the XPUs is not possible.
Please note that the knowledge about XPUs and the used rules, in-
cluding rule ownerships, was not available before and we only gained
it by this process, although presented earlier in this document in Sec-
tion 6.2.1.
11.2 fuse bits
The SoC includes a set of one-time-programmable fuse bits. Similar
to a regular fuse, they can be either intact or blown, with the first
state representing a zero bit and the blown state a one. This means
that zeros can be programmed to ones later by blowing a fuse but
it is physically impossible to change a one back to a zero. Bits are
logically grouped and accessed in registers of 32 bits.One-time-
programmable fuse






to disable it again.
The first and second stage modem bootloaders, PBL and MBA, read
one of these fuse bits in order to determine if secure boot is enabled,
meaning that the loaded image needs to be authenticated. If the bit
is zero, the signature checking code is skipped. As a blown fuse bit
enables the feature, it is not possible to deactivate it again later. For
the main target MSM8974, this fuse bit is accessible by the sixth lowest
bit of the physical address 0xFC4BE040 for authentication of the MBA
image, respectively 0xFC4BE044 for the actual firmware image.
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As expected, in the Google Nexus 5 we found these fuses to be
blown, in contrast to the Asus PadFone Infinity 2 with deactivated sig-
nature checks where they contain zeros.
11.2.1 Locking access to fuse bits
Our next idea was to combine the findings of the last two sections.
When a region is locked by a XPU, read accesses to these location
return only zeros. As the value of an unblown fuse bit is zero, we can
in consequence make blown fuse bits look to subsystems again as if
they were unblown. We can thus say that we are inversing the pur-
pose of XPUs, from protection units to using them to mount attacks
against the systems security.
We were indeed able to use this idea to trick functions checking
fuse bits of the TrustZone to return manipulated values. For example,
the secure world code allows to write fuses but blocks writes to some
regions depending on fuse bit configurations. A XPU lock allowed us
to let the function responsible for checking the address return that a
write is allowed, even for previously blocked regions.
However, an attack against the MBA or PBL of the modem was not
successful. In theory, locking access to the fuse bits for the modem Using XPUs to
prevent accesses to
fuse bits makes






would also make it read only zero bits. Therefore, the previously de-
scribed check of the bit responsible to indicate the secure boot status
would return that the image does not need to be authenticated. Re-
grettably, the bootloaders hung up completely when we tried this. A
command to the MBA to authenticate the image metadata, for exam-
ple, never returns a result, not even an error code.
It is also only possible to lock all fuse bits together since the fuse pe-
ripheral is protected by an APU and not an MPU. As a consequence,
the lock might cause problems for other fuses which now also read
zero. We thus analyzed all accesses of the MBA to fuse bits but could
not find any access that would explain the observed behavior.
Nevertheless, we tried to place the lock only at the time when
the intended target fuse bit is read. As we do not get any feedback
from the modem after sending the authentication command, we de-
termined this timing indirectly. After a known delay, we modified
the passed metadata such that it is incorrect and the authentication
should fail, in case we did the modification before the authentication
started. During the actual authentication, we cannot modify the data
as the MBA removes write rights from other subsystems for the mem-
ory region containing the data. After, it would not change the result
anymore. With this method, we know if the write occurred before the
authentication process started or not. By slowly increasing the delay
time and observing the result of the authentication, it gets possible to
determine the actual delay between the command and the start of the
authentication function. As the check of the target fuse bit is done
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directly before this in the code, we now know when we have to lock
the XPU. Unfortunately, the timed lock also did not prevent the MBA
from crashing.
As a consequence, we assume that the modem DSP sees the access
error on the system bus and, in contrast to the main application pro-
cessor, raises an exception. The entries for bus errors in the exception
vector tables of the MBA and the modem’s firmware point to code
which leads to a “halt” instruction, after some other code. Thus, this
would explain the observed behavior well.
Although we could not identify any possibility to fully verify this
assumption yet, another observation supports it. We tried to lock the
access for the modem to a part of its memory region, containing only
text strings, by an additional rule overlapping the modem’s rules.
If we configure the owner of this not as the modem, according to
Table 10, the target region gets locked for all accesses. Indeed, the
modem’s behavior is influenced by the new rule. The modem did
not just read empty strings but again stopped operating completely.
Please note that, even though it seems not to be possible to use XPU
locks on fuse bits to tamper with the modem’s operation, it might be
possible to use it in the other direction: to tamper with TrustZone
code from the modem subsystem, as it should be possible to place
the same locks we used in our experiments from the modem’s code.
11.2.2 Changing the root-of-trust
A hash of a root certificate is used as the root-of-trust for the modem’s
firmware loading. This hash is compared with the computed hash of
a certificate embedded in the loaded image and the certificate is only
accepted if the two hashes match.
For the MBA, its image file usually includes this root-of-trust. How-
ever, in the function responsible for reading the hash, we found thatThe source of the
root-of-trust can be
changed to a region
of fuse bits.
Regrettably, it was
not possible to write
own data to this
location.
OEMs have the option to place the hash in fuse values instead, acti-
vated again by another fuse bit.
Since the fuse to active reading the hash from fuses is set to zero,
we can blow it and change the source of the root-of-trust. This is
only interesting if it is possible to write the fuse bits containing the
hash, thus giving us the ability to provide our own root certificate
and sign images with the corresponding key. Other fuses configure
the related region as write protected which is enforced in software
in the TrustZone code. Even after bypassing these checks, either with
the previously described XPU locks or by directly calling the internal
functions after the checks, we were not able to change the needed
fuse bits to place our own hash value.
The reason for this could be that the hardware also enforces the
write protection additionally. Another possibility is that a rule of the
modem in the XPU for the fuse bit hardware prevents the access.
Part IV
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
In the final part of this thesis, we summarize and discuss
the results. An outlook on possible further work follows.
At last, we draw conclusions from the results.
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D I S C U S S I O N
After presenting all details of our work, we now discuss the implica-
tions of it. Especially, we have a detailed look at the cases in which
our contributions are useful, in three senses:
• Considered scenario with full access to the device (Section 12.1)
• Target devices (Section 12.2)
• Actual applications (Section 12.3)
Even though these were outlined in the motivation already, we can
now review how well we satisfy these and extend to a broader range
of use cases.
Before the discussion, let us shortly summarize the main achieve-
ments presented throughout this thesis:
analysis of the modem internals We analyzed the hardware
of the modem system by identifying its components and their
system level architecture inside Qualcomm’s SoC, including a
detailed description of the utilized Hexagon DSP. We then used
this knowledge in the study of the software which is executed
by the processor.
development of a patching framework Building on the re-
sults of the analysis, we developed a framework allowing to
apply code patches written in a high-level programming lan-
guage, augmented with simple annotations, to firmware images.
Unfortunately, images are authenticated on many devices and,
without the private keys of the Original Equipment Manufac-
turer (OEM), the framework cannot include correct signatures
in a patched image, meaning we cannot target these devices yet.
implementation of example applications We created a set
of example applications. These range from simple test and de-
bugging patches to complex implementations, which directly
can be used for research projects (e.g. LTE channel matrix ex-
traction). For this, we reverse engineered the corresponding
parts of the firmware in detail.
12.1 considered scenario
Our approach for firmware modifications and all the example appli-
cations consider a scenario where we have full access to the phone.
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We are able to gain superuser (root) rights in the Android OS. In
addition, we can modify the system’s kernel, including changes toAs we want to
modify our own
phone, we consider a
scenario with full
access to the phone.
existing modules and extending it with own kernel modules. This
is, for example, necessary to add our module for direct communi-
cation from a user space application with patch code in the modem
over the QMI protocol. Furthermore, we can replace the modem firm-
ware, however, this is actually a consequence of the previous abilities
as we can overwrite the firmware partition with root rights or sim-
ply change the modem firmware loader in the kernel to load it from
another location.
Event though these assumptions might sound unrealistic at first,
they are all given if we recall our aim again: we want to modify
the modem of a phone owned by ourselves, to which we have full
access and not to attack a device under control of another party which
would grant us only limited rights. On the other hand, modifying
the modem’s firmware by end-users is not an intended use case of
the device. As we saw, even with highest rights an end-user can get
on a device and the ability to change all data stored in the device’s
memory, this is still prevented.
12.1.1 Extending the scenario
The results of this work can also be applied to a broader range of sce-
narios, in particular attack cases. Although we can already consider
our main scenario as an attack since a modification of the modem’s
firmware is somehow not a legitimate use even if we own the device,
attacks here especially mean intrusion of devices not in our posses-
sion, thus having limited rights. We discuss two such scenarios in the
following.
In the first case, an attacker first targets the Android system. By
exploiting vulnerabilities of the HLOS, the intruder gains full access





main scenario, the attacker can apply the same methodology to mod-
ify the modem’s firmware. Since the intruder first needs to break the
Androids security scheme, its usefulness is questionable. Neverthe-
less, there are still advantages for an attacker in escalating further to
the modem system. By deleting all malicious code on the Android
system after changing the modem, the intrusion can be hidden well
and all known countermeasures like virus detectors are unable to de-
tect it. In addition, the attacker gains a set of new possibilities which
is the topic of Section 12.3.1.
The attacker in the second case is less strong. He targets the mo-
dem directly and finds a vulnerability, or a collection of multiple vul-
nerabilities, directly in the modem code, for example in a message
parser, be it for an interface to the Android system or for messages in
a mobile communication technology. With this, the intruder manages
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to craft a write gadget allowing arbitrary writes to all location of the
modem’s memory, including code and data sections. Subject to the
strength of this write primitive and the available payload, the attacker
can then either also completely replace the modem firmware or act
more targeted and just apply the modifications needed for his patch.
Note that the output of the patching framework could also be used
in this case. The intruder can then mount the same variety of attacks
as in the first scenario, depending on the used attack vector, possibly
injecting the malicious code over-the-air.
12.2 target devices
We conducted the work in this thesis mainly on a single SoC, even
on a single device with this chip (MSM8974, Asus PadFone Infinity
2). However, as already mentioned, the hardware and software of
the modem part in Qualcomm SoCs obviously is not redesigned from
scratch for every new chip but only slightly modified. The only bigger
change in the baseband design was the shift to the fully Hexagon
based architecture, running all logic on this DSP instead of a separate
ARM core as used before by Qualcomm. Thus, most results of the
analysis part are also valid for many other SoCs, as long as they
are based on the new Hexagon design. Note that large parts of the
software analysis are even valid for ARM based designs as, although
the implementation was moved to the DSP processor, it still originates
from the same code base.
In general, the modification framework itself is independent of the
target. After all, due to the used tools in the processing steps, it is Even though this
thesis focuses on a
single device, most
results can also be
applied to other
phones. For devices
with the same SoC,
we can already do
this automatically.
limited to Hexagon modems. Apart from this, only the firmware im-
age and its wrapper header used as input files are target dependent,
which means that we only have to generate a new wrapper header in
order to support a new target. The evaluation of the presented port-
ing tools (Section 9.3.3) shows that moving to a new device with the
same SoC can be done almost automatically, only few details have to
be added manually. On the other hand, for porting to another SoC,
our tools do not provide sufficient performance yet, meaning that the
reverse engineering steps to discover functions and their locations
have to be done by hand again, or better tools for the automation of
this step need to be developed. Luckily, this is only a small part of
the reverse engineering process. The more complicated analysis on
how the code works, how functionality is implemented, for example
the purposes of functions, still applies. We described this, for firm-
ware parts related to the implemented patches, in the corresponding
section of Chapter 10.
Keep also in mind that locating functions was not the main con-
tribution in Part iii but instead the framework allowing easy mod-
ifications of the firmware binary, after the function information is
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collected, as well as the implementation of example patches which
are independent of the actual location of functions in the target bi-
nary. Anyway, the reverse engineering process has to be performed
for new patches targeting not yet discovered parts of the firmware
code. This can then be done directly for the desired target.
12.2.1 Bypassing the firmware authentication
We explained in Section 7.2 that the firmware image on most devices
is digitally signed and in Chapter 11 we showed our efforts to break
this security feature in order to be able to run modified modem firm-
wares also on these devices. However, our attempts were not yet
successful. Therefore, we discuss further possibilities here.
As explained before, the modem shares the system’s memory with
the application processor. Accesses to regions of the other entity are
prevented by XPUs. Thus, a low-level rowhammer attack against the
memory chip itself might be able to compromise the modem’s secu-
rity. This attack uses a hardware bug present in many memory chips
which allows to modify bits in the memory by repeatably reading
other bytes that are physically located next to the target bit in the
memory chip. The first bytes owned by the modem are physically ad-
jacent to bytes owned by the application processor. As a consequence,
they might be vulnerable to bit flips by only accessing memory not
belonging to the modem. XPUs would not prevent such an attack as
the target location does not need to be actually accessed.
In “Drammer: Deterministic rowhammer attacks on mobile plat-
forms” [38], the authors indeed could show that rowhammer attacksMost devices
authenticate the
modem’s firmware




have the potential to
achieve this.
are possible on mobile devices, including the Nexus 5. The problem
with this approach is that only a few bits are vulnerable on each
DRAM chip and that these are different for each instance. As a result,
for each individual device, we have to check which vulnerable bits
lead to exploitable situations. The chances for such a case are low if
we look at the numbers presented in the paper: 12 out of 15 tested
Nexus 5 devices showed bit flips, in the best case with an average
distance of 1 kB between two bits that could be flipped. Due to the
row size of the used DRAM chip of 64 kB, we can thus expect approx-
imately 64 bits in the modem firmware region that can be flipped
by the application processor, for such a best case device. We now
need that one of these flips is, for example, in the distance value of
a jump that we can modify to let the DSP start executing code in an
non-secure location, which is not very likely.
Using such a simple change might cause other problems, for exam-
ple the modified location will not be mapped for the modem, further
decreasing the chances of a successful exploit. It might, however, be
possible to use this method to tamper with the authentication of meta-
data as here the attacker can freely choose the location of the data and
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by this select a position such that a vulnerable bit is present at the de-
sired location. On the other hand, this way is limited to apply single
bit changes to the information in the firmware metadata which might
not be sufficient for an attack. As our test device did not show any
bit flips with the drammer example code, we did not perform further
experiments in this direction.
In contrast to these attack vectors, we should evaluate classical run-
time attacks. Although we already explained why we estimate the
chances for these to be rather low, there might still be exploitable vul-
nerabilities in Qualcomm’s code. These could be discovered by statical
code analysis as well as dynamical methods such as fuzzing.
12.3 applications
After discussing the scenarios in which the results of this work can
be used and evaluating the range of target devices, we now have a
look at the actual applications, meaning for what exactly we can use
the modem modification possibilities on the target devices. The im-
plemented example applications give a first idea of what can be done.
Roughly speaking, everything related to the mobile communication
technologies implemented in the modem is possible, not limited to
the focus on the LTE technology in this thesis. In the following, we
detail these further, categorize and give examples.
All these applications can in general be used in all scenarios, nev-
ertheless, many only make sense in a subset of the scenarios. An
attacker, for example, might not be interested in improving video
streaming applications on the target device (we explain this example
later) but instead like to intercept SMS messages. On the other hand,
if we modify our own phone we are (usually) not interested in spying
ourselves but instead might want to improve the service quality in the
aforementioned use case. However, there are also applications which
can be used in both scenarios. Sniffing LTE MAC layer messages is
such an example as it can be utilized by an attacker to intercept user
data and by researchers to analyze the mobile network.
12.3.1 Malicious applications
When extending our scenario, we outlined why attackers would be
interested in changing code of the modem but we still miss a dis-
cussion of the possibilities they gain by this, thus which malicious Access to the
modem’s firmware






applications modem firmware modifications provide. As this is not
the main focus of this work, we keep the section short and only pro-
vide first ideas. Attackers with malicious intentions will easily find
many more application ideas.
Obviously, the ability to modify the baseband’s code allows to inter-
cept all user traffic passing over the mobile network interface, includ-
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ing IP traffic as well as phone calls and other services like SMS. With
the GPS being integrated with the modem subsystem, an exact user
location is also available to the adversary. In addition to these pas-
sive attacks, attackers can actively suppress messages or calls, send
messages in the name of the phone user or listen to the devices en-
vironment even when the phone is not in use by triggering a call
to themselves. Intruders can go even further and try to hide their
attacks also from the network side by leaking the information over
another communication channel than the mobile network. With the
modem hardware, they can send arbitrary signals and are not bound
to the mobile standards. Therefore, attackers can implement their
own communication directly with a remote station under their con-
trol, in addition to the usual mobile network operation such that no
disruption of the service is noticeable. Thanks to the high transmit
power and with that transmission range of the modem, the attacker
can communicate with the target device from a large distance, at least
equal to the range of the supported mobile network technologies.
All these attacks have in common that they attack the device itself,
respectively its user. They are contrasted by attacks against the net-
work which can also influence other devices in the proximity using
the same network cell or directly try to harm the base station. Send-
ing manipulated messages to the base station is such a case. Here,
an attacker could try to exploit vulnerabilities of the base station’s
implementation with messages containing data to trigger behavior
not desired by the operator. Instead of such a rather focused attack,
only modified values could be sent to the base station to influence
mechanisms of the mobile technology, for example to manipulate the
downlink resource scheduling in LTE.
Attackers controlling multiple devices could also turn all phones
under their control into jammers, all sending with the maximal avail-
able transmit power, possibly leading to severe service disruptions
for all communication in network cells in the proximity.
12.3.2 Modifications wanted by the user
In contrast to these malicious applications, the motivation of this
work was to enable modifications to the modem which are actually
wanted by the user of the device. These again contain two subcat-
egories: tools for research and end-user applications, or experienceUsers may want to
modify their own
modem to use it as a
research tool as well
as to add new
features.
enhancements for existing ones. Note that the categories are by no
means including all possible applications but just represent use cases
we can currently think of. Similarly to the categorization into wanted
and malicious applications, the subcategories are strongly related to
each other, for example the development of most new user applica-
tions will need to be preceded by research.
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Let us consider the following scenario: we want to develop an
application able to detect burglars in an apartment by monitoring
variations in the LTE channel estimations, similar to solutions that
have been shown for WiFi, for example in [2]. For this, we first need
to extract the CSI values as done in the example application in Sec-
tion 10.6. We then have to develop algorithms which are able to detect
the desired event in this data. Until now, we used the modification
capability only as a tool for our research, we could have done this re-
search also on another platform, for example with an SDR. In the last
step, we use the results of the research to implement the actual end-
user application, including the necessary modifications to the modem
firmware.
12.3.2.1 Research tools
One of the main motivations for our work was to open the modem
in off-the-shelf smartphones for research projects, leading to a cheap
platform and removing the need for special equipment in many cases.
With the presented modification framework, this was realized. All Smartphone modems






implemented example applications fall into this category.
Research applications include:
• Logging low-level messages and modem internal data, e.g. for
analysis of network cells
• Testing new algorithms, e.g. improved implementations of parts
of the LTE stack
• Evaluating new features directly on the final target devices
• Modifying data sent to a base station, e.g. for active analysis of
network behavior
The last case is close to an attack against the network. However, it
differs by our intention to analyze how current implementations in
base stations react to certain cases instead of harming the system or
other users. Such message modifications could, for example, con-
tain manipulated Quality of Service (QoS) tags for data packages or
report wrong CSI values in order to try to trick the base station to
assign more of the available resources to us, thus stealing them from
other users. Note that too high CSI values might actually degrade our
throughput as LTE then chooses higher modulation schemes, leading
to high error rates if the real conditions are not good enough to sup-
port these. Nevertheless, an attacker to the network could still be
interested in doing so as it might also degrade service quality for
other users and, therefore, research on the base station’s behavior is
also useful in these cases.
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12.3.2.2 End-user applications
We can also use firmware modifications to implement additional fea-
tures which are only available in other modem models but not in-
cluded in the firmware of the desired device, for example Voice over
LTE (VoLTE) support.
Even more interesting are features which are not implemented by
today’s modems of smartphones at all. This could be because the
manufacturer sees no advantages in implementing it or because the
new feature is a recent research result which did not yet reach con-
sumer devices, maybe even our own new improvement idea in a re-
search project.
Such features can obviously be completely new applications, like







include improvements of the user experience of an already existing
smartphone application. For instance, one could use information cur-
rently only available inside the baseband to allow user applications
a better estimation of the current network communication state and
with that enhance their performance. Such an example is adaptive
video streaming, enriched with information from the LTE physical
layer as used in the piStream project [43]. To gather the needed in-
formation in their test implementation, the authors used an SDR in
addition to the target smartphone. With the ability to modify the
phone’s modem firmware, the need for this additional device gets re-
moved and the whole solution could be implemented on the phone,
leading to a practically usable and directly deployable solution.
We see that the modification capability removes the need to wait for
manufacturers to include new features. Producing a working imple-
mentation example of usually rather abstract research results allows
evaluation of the new feature in user studies. It is also easier to show
the usefulness of the results to companies and end-users, increasing
the chances for it to be adapted in commercial products later. Even if
not adapted, it can at least be used on the target devices supported
by the example implementation, generating a practical outcome from
the research project directly to end-users in any case.
12.4 outlook
This thesis covered a large range of topics, from analyzing the mo-
dem’s hardware and software, over the development of a patching
framework, to the implementation of patch projects. As a result,
there are many opportunities to improve, supplement or to extend
our work. We already mentioned some of these in the corresponding
chapters. The main open topics are:
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• Finding a way to bypass the firmware authentication. For now,
the patching framework is limited to devices on which this se-
curity feature is disabled, thus to a small set of targets.
• Improvement of the automated porting tools by using more ad-
vanced matching techniques, in order to allow faster porting
to other SoCs and smartphones. This also extends the list of
possible target devices.
• Analyzing further parts of the communication stack in detail
and identifying more functions, including their purpose, param-
eters and locations. We did such a deep study only for relevant
parts in the example projects. However, new applications will
likely focus on other sections of the firmware. As the modem
firmware contains a lot of code, it is, unfortunately, not feasible
to reverse engineer the whole code such that the most interest-
ing parts have to be selected.
• Implementing more tools for the most common research pur-
poses, removing the need to do so before an actual project.
Thereby, we could also enable users unfamiliar with the still A few parts of this
work leave room for
small improvements.




rather low-level coding of patches and the required reverse en-
gineering steps to use the modems in off-the-shelf phones as
a research platform. In addition, for many projects, the time
to implement the required patches will not be available, thus
still commercial equipment supporting the needed features will
be bought, which can only be overcome by already supplying
patch code for such features.
• Demonstration of attack scenarios as outlined in the discussion
of the considered scenario. This includes showing an attack
gaining access to the modem firmware as well as indicating ma-
licious actions the intruder could perform.
• Realization of an end-user application with the modification
framework. Since all the presented example projects are re-
search tools, we lack the demonstration of an application in-
teresting for end-users.
• Extending the firmware modifications to new use cases. For
example, it should be possible to transform the modem into a
complete SDR.
In summary, we see that although further work can be done on the
presented work itself, the biggest open topics are concerned with ex-
tending the range of target devices and using the resulting implemen-
tations in real world application cases.

13
C O N C L U S I O N S
In this work, we were able to shed light on a black box in today’s
smartphones, the modem. Reverse engineering revealed several inter-
nal details. Furthermore, we could demonstrate that modifying the We successfully
looked into the
modem’s black box





modem firmware is possible and practical. It allows to collect inter-
nal data, as well as modifying functionality and adding completely
new features.
We learned that reverse engineering code for Qualcomm’s Hexagon
DSP is feasible and supported by some tools, although not yet as
advanced as for ARM processors for example. Plugins for the IDA
tool exist but contain problems including incomplete detection of
functions and displaying wrong immediate values in assembly code
views. Also, as far as we know, no decompiler exists. This means that
we have to perform all analysis directly on the assembly code.
From our analysis of the firmware code, we can say that security
measures strongly improved compared to the results of previous re-
search on mobile communication modems that we saw in the related






ditions in all functions. Also, checks for the length of passed argu-
ments, especially in parsers for messages originating from external
sources (Android system or over-the-air interface), were added to the
code. Since a programmer can always oversee a security issue, these
are complemented by automated mechanisms using well known ex-
ploit mitigation techniques. For instance, stack canaries are inserted
against stack overflow exploitation and access permissions of mem-
ory segments prevent execution of data and the modification of in-
structions.
The runtime security features supplement the authentication of the
loaded firmware image, protecting from loading modified code in
the first place. Afterwards, hardware units lock the access to the
corresponding memory regions, making it impossible to manipulate
internals of the baseband from other subsystems integrated in the
SoC, for example the main processor. As a result, we can say that
Qualcomm got aware of the importance of a secure modem subsystem
nowadays and raised the bar for successful attacks significantly. Our
discussion of malicious applications underlines this need for strong
attack countermeasures.
Unfortunately, security strongly depends on the OEMs which can
decide which security features they activate. In the case of our pri-
mary target device, we found the firmware authentication to be dis-
abled completely, leaving an attacker who gained root rights in An-
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droid in a sufficiently strong position to replace the modem firmware
permanently.
Fortunately, even though weak security is bad for protection of end-
users, it also is the key to allow us to modify the baseband. In this
way, we can use the modem in commercial devices for our intentions
as research platform and to implement new features for end-users.
All in all, this work should represent a good basis for further re-
search on Qualcomm modems. Furthermore, we would be glad if the
presented modification framework, or even the applications we im-
plemented with it, proof themselves to be useful in future projects.
Part V
A P P E N D I X

A
A P P E N D I X
a.1 task startup sequence
In addition to the list of running tasks presented in Section 7.3.1, we
observed the startup sequence of the modem with the hooked rcinit
task start functions and additions to the thread creation function of
QuRT. Listing 7 shows the results. Please note that QuRT threads use
a priority value inverse to the one of the init system, with zero being
the highest priority and 255 the lowest.
Listing 7: Startup sequence of tasks and corre-
sponding thread creations
qurt_thread_create: DPC Task, 87























rcinit starting task: tmr_slave2, 162
qurt_thread_create: tmr_slave2, 93
rcinit starting task: tmr_slave1, 162
qurt_thread_create: tmr_slave1, 93
rcinit starting task: tmr_slave3, 162
30 qurt_thread_create: tmr_slave3, 93
rcinit starting task: timer, 163
qurt_thread_create: timer, 92
rcinit starting task: time_ipc, 64
qurt_thread_create: time_ipc, 191
rcinit starting task: sys_m_qmi, 152
qurt_thread_create: sys_m_qmi, 103
rcinit starting task: nv, 60
qurt_thread_create: nv, 195
rcinit starting task: fs, 62
40 qurt_thread_create: fs, 193
rcinit starting task: sys_m_smsm, 152
qurt_thread_create: sys_m_smsm, 103




rcinit starting task: dog, 164
qurt_thread_create: dog, 91
qurt_thread_create: IST68, 77
50 qurt_thread_create: IST74, 77
qurt_thread_create: FS Benchmar, 252
qurt_thread_create: QMI_PING_SV, 245
qurt_thread_create: modem_sec_xpu_I, 144
rcinit starting task: secrnd, 34
qurt_thread_create: secrnd, 221
rcinit starting task: npascheduler, 162
qurt_thread_create: npaschedule, 93
rcinit starting task: thermal, 78
qurt_thread_create: thermal, 177
60 rcinit starting task: seccryptarm, 24
qurt_thread_create: seccryptarm, 231
rcinit starting task: sleep, 1
qurt_thread_create: sleep, 254
rcinit starting task: fs_async_put, 8
qurt_thread_create: fs_async_pu, 247
rcinit starting task: sec, 29
qurt_thread_create: sec, 226
rcinit starting task: diag, 76
qurt_thread_create: diag, 179






















90 qurt_thread_create: IST96, 77
qurt_thread_create: IST97, 77
rcinit starting task: a2_log, 8
qurt_thread_create: a2_log, 247
rcinit starting task: slpc, 161
qurt_thread_create: slpc, 94
rcinit starting task: a2_ul_per, 106
qurt_thread_create: a2_ul_per, 149
rcinit starting task: rf_apps, 94
qurt_thread_create: rf_apps, 161
100 rcinit starting task: rf_fwrsp, 160
qurt_thread_create: rf_fwrsp, 95
rcinit starting task: rf, 160
qurt_thread_create: rf, 95
rcinit starting task: a2, 125
qurt_thread_create: a2, 130
rcinit starting task: rf_ic, 160
qurt_thread_create: rf_ic, 95
rcinit starting task: ftm, 74
qurt_thread_create: ftm, 181
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a.2 occurred problems
During the practical modification part of our work, we encountered
a set of problems. In Section 10.1.2.1, we already discussed the not
unique assignment of identification information for the QMI test ser-
vice and gave a solution. In the following, we explain further oc-
curred problems.
a.2.1 Hexagon issues
We start with issues related to the Hexagon DSP found in Qualcomm’s
modems.
a.2.1.1 Unaligned accesses
The Hexagon processor only supports aligned accesses to data, mean-
ing that, for example, the address of a data word (32 bits) needs to
be divisible by four. Since patch codes will unlikely require more
than 16 bits to distinguish between patch services, we used only a
half word for service identification in our first protocol for tunnel-
ing QMI messages. As a consequence, service handlers got a pointer
which was not properly aligned for four byte accesses from our ser-
vice dispatcher code and the patch programmer would need to take
care of this. It is not possible to simply shift the whole buffer by two
bytes as it is part of a structure passed to a QMI function from Qual-
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comm which also needs to be word aligned. Thus, even though not
required and increasing the overhead by two bytes, we now reserved
a full word for service identification, making the programming of
handlers more intuitive and less error prone.
a.2.1.2 Hexagon assembler
Disassembled Hexagon code contains immediate extenders (immext).
Unfortunately, the DSP’s assembler does not support these in its in-
put but rather expects immediate values which should be extended
preceded by two sharps. As a result, code produced by a disassem-
bler, be it Qualcomm’s own implementation or the hexagondisasm dis-
assembler from [26], cannot be fed into the assembler again directly.
We have to remove the immext instructions before. This is required
in the generation of fw_org functions where we disassemble the first
instructions of the original function and implement them again in
inline assembler in the generated function.
a.2.1.3 Hexagon linker
In Section 9.2.3.2, we presented how fw_org functions are generated.
We showed that some immediate values are relative to the instruc-
tions position and, therefore, need to to be adapted when the instruc-
tion is moved to another location. We explained that we can simply
define symbols for these which will be resolved automatically by the
linker.
The obvious way is to define a symbol with a value of the instruc-
tions original address, or the start address of the packet to be precise,
and add the original immediate value to it in the generated assembly
code. Thereby, the linker will handle problems with too large imme-
diate values. If the instruction is, for example, a jump further than it
can be encoded in the immediate field, the linker will generate “tram-
poline” code which performs the far jump and redirect the limited
range jump to this code.
Unfortunately, the linker has a bug which can be triggered by this.
Whenever two jumps in the same instruction packet are so far that
they require a trampoline, meaning we would use the same symbol
for them and just add different immediate values, the linker generates
only a single trampoline, to the destination of the first jump. As a
result, the second jump ends in a wrong destination.
We solved this problem by not using a sum of a symbol and an
immediate value but rather generating a symbol directly for the ab-
solute value (destination) and using this in the generated assembly
code.
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a.2.2 Fastboot with the Asus PadFone Infinity 2
Android devices can be booted into a special fastboot mode. The boot
process then stops in the bootloader and it is, for example, possible to
boot a custom kernel, if the bootloader is unlocked to allow this. Usu-
ally, pressing a certain key combination when turning on the device
(e.g. volume up + power) or a reboot option from a running Android
system allows to reach this mode.
According to several communities in the Internet, this should also
be possible with the Asus PadFone Infinity 2. Regrettably, our device
simply ignores the pressed key or the reboot target and boots the
Android system instead. However, we needed to load our own kernel
image.
This issue could be overcome with a simple trick. Android smart-
phones contain another mode called recovery which starts without
problems on the device. We intentionally break this recovery, so that
it cannot be executed anymore. Then, we tell the device to boot into
this mode, which results in an error and the PadFone staying in the
bootloader, giving us the desired fastboot mode. Listing 8 contains a
short script for this.
Note that the recovery mode is automatically repaired. Therefore,
at the next start of the device, the recovery mode is working again and
our trick did not break any functionality of the phone.
Listing 8: Script to start fastboot on the Asus PadFone Infinity 2
1 #!/bin/sh
2 # write broken recovery
3 adb shell "su -c dd if=/dev/zero
↪→ of=/dev/block/platform/msm_sdcc.1/by-name/recovery bs=2048
↪→ count=6995; sync;"
4 # reboot to recovery
5 adb reboot recovery
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
[1] ARM Limited. “ARM1156T2-S Technical Reference Manual.”
Revision: r0p4. July 2007.
[2] M. A. A. Al-qaness et al. “Device-Free Home Intruder Detection
and Alarm System Using Wi-Fi Channel State Information.”
In: International Journal of Future Computer and Communication
(IJFCC) 5.4 (2016), p. 180. IACSIT Press.
[3] Asus Global. “The new PadFone Infinity (A86).” (last access:
March 15, 2017). url: https://www.asus.com/Phone/The_new_
PadFone_Infinity_A86/specifications/.
[4] Azenqos. “AZQ Android - DriveTest Solution for LTE, WCDMA
& GSM.” (last access: March 3, 2017). url: http://www.azenqos.
com/.
[5] A. Basir. “Random Access Procedure in LTE.” (last access: March
2, 2017). url: http : / / www . simpletechpost . com / 2013 / 04 /
random-access-procedure-rach-in-lte.html.
[6] E. Bendersky. “pycparser: Complete C99 parser in pure Python.”
(last access: February 4, 2017). url: https : / / github . com /
eliben/pycparser.
[7] G. Beniamini (laginimaineb). “Bits, Please!: Full TrustZone ex-
ploit for MSM8974.” (last access: April 22, 2017). url: http :
/ / bits - please . blogspot . de / 2015 / 08 / full - trustzone -
exploit-for-msm8974.html.
[8] N. Bui and J. Widmer. “OWL: a reliable online watcher for LTE
control channel measurements.” In: ArXiv e-prints (2016). arXiv:
1606.00202 [cs.NI].
[9] J. Cichonski, J. M. Franklin, and M. Bartock. “LTE Architecture
Overview and Security Analysis.” In: NIST Internal or Intera-
gency Reports (NISTIR) Draft 8071 (2016). NIST.
[10] L. Codrescu et al. “Hexagon DSP: An architecture optimized
for mobile multimedia and communications.” In: IEEE Micro
34.2 (2014), pp. 34–43. IEEE Computer Society.
[11] G. Delugré. “Reverse engineering a Qualcomm baseband.” In:
28th Chaos Communication Congress (28C3). Berlin, Germany, 2011.
CCC.
[12] S. Dhagle. “LTE Resources by Sandesh Dhagle.” (last access:
February 27, 2017). url: http://dhagle.in/LTE.
117
118 Bibliography
[13] N. Golde and D. Komaromy (Comsecuris). “Breaking Band re-
verse engineering and exploiting the shannon baseband.” In:
Reverse engineering conference (REcon) 2016. Montreal, Canada,
2016.
[14] L. Gwennap. “Qualcomm Extends Hexagon DSP.” In: Micropro-
cessor Report 27 (2013), pp. 13–15. The Linley Group.
[15] D. Halperin et al. “Linux 802.11n CSI Tool.” (last access: Febru-
ary 23, 2017). url: http://dhalperi.github.io/linux-80211n-
csitool/.
[16] D. Halperin et al. “Tool Release: Gathering 802.11n Traces with
Channel State Information.” In: Computer Communication Review
(CCR) 41.1 (2011), p. 53. ACM SIGCOMM.
[17] W. Hengeveld. “IDA processor module for the hexagon
(QDSP6v55) processor.” (last access: Januar 14, 2017). url: htt
ps://github.com/gsmk/hexagon.
[18] International Data Corporation (IDC). “Smartphone OS Market
Share.” (last access: Januar 10, 2017). url: http://www.idc.com/
promo/smartphone-market-share.
[19] A. Kloeckner. “pycparserext: Extensions for Eli Bendersky’s py-
cparser.” (last access: February 4, 2017). url: https://github.
com/inducer/pycparserext.
[20] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti. “HMAC: Keyed-
hashing for message authentication.” RFC 2104. 1997. IETF.
[21] S Kundojjala (Strategy Analytics). “Baseband Market Share
Tracker Q2 2016: MediaTek and Spreadtrum Together Take One-
third LTE Volume Share.” Tech. rep. Sept. 2016. Strategy Ana-
lytics.
[22] LG Electronics. “D820 Sprint Black.” (last access: March 15, 2017).
url: http://www.lg.com/us/cell-phones/lg-D820-Sprint-
Black-nexus-5.
[23] Y. Li et al. “Mobileinsight: Extracting and analyzing cellular net-
work information on smartphones.” In: The 22nd Annual Interna-
tional Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom
2016). New York, USA, 2016, pp. 202–215. ACM SIGMOBILE.
[24] L. Miras. “Baseband playground.” In: Ekoparty 2011. Buenos
Aires, Argentina, 2011.
[25] L. Molas et al. “Hexag00n IDA plugin.” (last access: Januar 14,
2017). url: https://github.com/programa-stic/hexag00n.
[26] L. Molas et al. “Qualcomm Hexagon Disassembler.” (last access:
February 4, 2017). url: https://github.com/programa-stic/
hexag00n/tree/master/hexagondisasm.
[27] A. Morgado (Lanedo GmbH). “Qualcomm Gobi devices in
Linux based systems.” 2013.
Bibliography 119
[28] Qualcomm Technologies Inc. “Hexagon DSP SDK - Qualcomm
Developer Network.” (last access: Januar 14, 2017). url: https:
//developer.qualcomm.com/software/hexagon-dsp-sdk.
[29] Qualcomm Technologies Inc. “Qualcomm 205 Mobile Platform.”
(last access: April 12, 2017). url: https://www.qualcomm.com/
products/qualcomm-205-mobile-platform.
[30] Qualcomm Technologies Inc. “QxDM Professional
QUALCOMM eXtensible Diagnostic Monitor.” (last access:
March 3, 2017). url: https : / / www . qualcomm . com / documen
ts/qxdm- professional- qualcomm- extensible- diagnostic-
monitor.
[31] Qualcomm Technologies Inc. “Snapdragon 800 Processor.” (last
access: March 15, 2017). url: https : / / www . qualcomm . com /
products/snapdragon/processors/800.
[32] Qualcomm Technologies Inc. “Hexagon V2 Programmers’s Ref-
erence Manual.” 80-NB419-1 Rev.A. Aug. 2011.
[33] Qualcomm Technologies Inc. “Hexagon V5x Programmers’s Ref-
erence Manual.” 80-N2040-8 Rev.H. Mar. 2016.
[34] J. Ryu. “Sharetechnote.” (last access: February 24, 2017). url:
http://www.sharetechnote.com/.
[35] A. Satpathy. “Channels in LTE.” (last access: February 26, 2017).
url: http://lteinwireless.blogspot.de/2011/05/channels-
in-lte.html.
[36] M. Schulz et al. “Nexmon: The C-based Firmware Patching
Framework for Broadcom/Cypress WiFi Chips that enables
Monitor Mode, Frame Injection and much more.” (last access:
February 2, 2017). url: https://github.com/seemoo- lab/
nexmon.
[37] Unknown (published from GitHub user "remittor"). “Qualcomm
mbn tools repository.” (last access: February 7, 2017). url: http
s://github.com/remittor/qcom-mbn-tools.
[38] V. van der Veen et al. “Drammer: Deterministic rowhammer
attacks on mobile platforms.” In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS ’16). Vienna, Austria, 2016, pp. 1675–1689. ACM.
[39] R.-P. Weinmann. “All your baseband are belong to us.” In: 27th
Chaos Communication Congress (27C3). Berlin, Germany, 2010.
CCC.
[40] R.-P. Weinmann. “Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of
Memory Corruptions in Cellular Protocol Stacks.” In: 6th
USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT ’12). Belle-
vue, USA, 2012, pp. 12–21. USENIX.
120 Bibliography
[41] R.-P. Weinmann. “Baseband exploitation in 2013: Hexagon chal-
lenges.” In: PACific SECurity (PacSec) 2013. Tokyo, Japan, 2013.
dragostech.com inc.
[42] Wireshark-Community. “MAC-LTE - The Wireshark Wiki.” (last
access: February 20, 2017). url: https://wiki.wireshark.org/
MAC-LTE.
[43] X. Xie et al. “piStream: Physical Layer Informed Adaptive Video
Streaming over LTE.” In: Proceedings of the 21st Annual Interna-
tional Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom
2015). Paris, France, 2015, pp. 413–425. ACM.
[44] tutorialspoint. “LTE Protocol Stack Layers.” (last access: Febru-
ary 24, 2017). url: https://www.tutorialspoint.com/lte/
lte_protocol_stack_layers.htm.
[45] zynamics / Google Inc. “zynamics.com - BinDiff.” (last access:
March 17, 2017). url: https://www.zynamics.com/bindiff.
html.
T H E S I S S TAT E M E N T
pursuant to § 22 paragraph 7 of APB TU Darmstadt
I herewith formally declare that I have written the submitted Master
Thesis independently. I did not use any outside support except for
the quoted literature and other sources mentioned in the paper. I
clearly marked and separately listed all of the literature and all of the
other sources which I employed when producing this academic work,
either literally or in content. This thesis has not been handed in or
published before in the same or similar form. In the submitted thesis
the written copies and the electronic version are identical in content.
Darmstadt, May 1, 2017
Carsten Gerald Bruns
E R K L Ä R U N G Z U R A B S C H L U S S A R B E I T
gemäß § 22 Abs. 7 APB der TU Darmstadt
Hiermit versichere ich die vorliegende Master Thesis ohne Hilfe Drit-
ter und nur mit den angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmitteln angefer-
tigt zu haben. Alle Stellen, die Quellen entnommen wurden, sind als
solche kenntlich gemacht worden. Diese Arbeit hat in gleicher oder
ähnlicher Form noch keiner Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen. In der ab-
gegebenen Thesis stimmen die schriftliche und elektronische Fassung
überein.
Darmstadt, 1. Mai 2017
Carsten Gerald Bruns
121
